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ABSTRACT 
 
In a private sale of equity, the issuing firm sells a block of securities only to an 
individual or a small group of investors at a discounted price. Non-participating 
shareholders not only suffer from ownership dilution but also lose the 
opportunity to enjoy the private placement discount. This thesis provides the first 
evidence on whether and how corporate governance can protect 
non-participating shareholders’ interests in the private equity issuing process. 
Based on a sample of 329 private placements issued by the top 250 Australian 
listed firms between 2002 and 2009, the results show that firms with a higher 
governance index, larger proportion of independent directors, and larger board 
size are more likely to issue private placements with a share purchase plan (SPP), 
which protects non-participating shareholders from ownership dilution. However 
corporate governance has no direct impact on private placement discounts. There 
is also support for the information asymmetry hypothesis where private 
placement discounts compensate investors for asymmetric information problem. 
These findings are robust to a correction for endogeneity and self-selection bias. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
Recent years have seen a huge increase in the use of private placements 
for raising capital. In the US alone, total capital raised via private placements 
soared from USD 1.87 billion in 1995 to 88 billion in 2006, with the number of 
private placements growing from 127 in 1996 to 2,719 in 2006.1 In the UK, private 
placements have become the first choice of seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
method since the restriction on the issue size of placements was lifted in 1996 
(Barnes & Walker, 2006). The situation is no different in Australia; capital raised 
via private placements has increased significantly from AUD 2.3 billion in 1995 to 
AUD 46 billion in 2009, a twenty-fold increase in just 15 years (ASX, 2010). 
Unlike other forms of SEOs which are made to all existing shareholders, such 
as rights issues and share purchase plans (SPPs), private placements are sold only 
to an individual or a small group of (institutional) investors at a substantial 
discount to the market price. In the US, the average private placement discount 
between 1995 and 2007 is 12.87%, which is equivalent to an average wealth of USD 
54.70 million being transferred from the issuing firm to private equity investors 
(Chakraborty & Gantchev, 2013). This substantial discount poses a serious threat 
to the wealth of non-participating shareholders, who are deprived of both the 
benefits of the large discount and the right to anti-dilute their wealth. Concerns 
for such inequity are best summarized by the following statement: 
                                                        
1 See Sagient Research (http://www.sagientresearch.com). Private placements include private 
investments in public equity (PIPE), 144-A placements, and Regulation S transactions. 
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“Placements are anything but innocuous for the shareholders who are excluded 
from the placement…. [During the global financial crisis,] 45 billion of equities 
were raised through private placements at an average discount of 12.3 per cent 
on the prevailing share price; and the average dilution to shareholders was 19 
per cent. What was even more concerning was existing shareholders paid for 
the privilege. A study released in 2010 estimated that investors paid just under 2 
per cent of all capital raised….” (Ferguson, 2012) 
 
Such concerns provide the motivation for this thesis, which aims to investigate 
whether corporate governance can mitigate the wealth transfer in private 
placement transactions in Australia.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance in terms of the 
likelihood of shareholders getting a return on their investment. Shareholders’ 
interests are thus better protected in better governed firms (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006; Doidge et al., 2007). For example, 
corporate governance can align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders through increasing dividend payout (La Porta et al., 2000b), 
providing better disclosure quality (Verriest et al., 2012), making more informative 
disclosure (Beekes & Brown, 2006), reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud 
(Chen et al., 2006), and constraining wealth transfer in related-party transactions 
(Datta et al., 1999).2 This thesis proposes that corporate governance can also 
constrain wealth transfer in private placement transactions. 
Private placements are a non-market price transaction, and their terms and 
conditions are determined by the bargaining power between firm insiders and 
private equity investors without shareholder approval. It is therefore unclear 
whether good corporate governance quality can effectively protect the interests 
of non-participating shareholders, who are considered as outsiders in a private 
                                                        
2 See also Brown et al. (2011) for a review of recent corporate governance literature. 
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equity issuing process. 
Australia provides an ideal context for this study for two reasons. First, 
Australia has limited mandatory regulations on private placements, which 
minimizes the influence of regulations on investor protection in private 
placements. Indeed, the regulation only stipulates that there is a 25% limitation on 
the capital which can be raised in a 12-month period. Regulatory bodies in other 
countries employ a wider range of restrictions on private placements in 
comparison. For example, in the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) rule 144 regulates that new shares issued through private placements 
cannot be sold in the open market for a period of up to two years after the issue 
date. The Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) are even stricter, 
regulating the minimal offer price of placements and also requiring that a 
minimum of 25% of new shares be issued to market makers (Barnes & Walker, 
2006). Similarly, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) imposes a maximum 10% discounts 
on private placement transactions (Chen et al., 2002).  
Second, in Australia, the code of good corporate governance is voluntary 
(Christensen et al., 2010). This lack of mandatory requirements suggests that there 
is variability in the regulatory environment mandating corporate governance 
mechanisms, which in turn provides an opportunity to test the impacts of 
firm-level governance.  
Finally, previous research on private placements tends to be US centric, 
with few studies considering the specific environment of other countries such as 
Australia. 
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1.2. Research Aims and Questions 
The primary aim of this thesis is to empirically examine the impact of 
corporate governance quality in protecting non-participating shareholders in 
private placement transactions. I ask two related research questions. First, I ask 
whether non-participating shareholders are better protected in better governed 
firms. Early studies suggest that the discount on private placements compensates 
the purchaser for the increased monitoring of management in the post-issue 
period (Wruck, 1989) and for exercising due diligence in assessing the true value 
of the issuing firms in the face of information asymmetry (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). 
Barclay et al. (2007) argue that the discount also reflects the compensation to 
passive investors for their implicit support of management entrenchment after 
the private placement as they seldom participate in the firm affairs. Although the 
relationship between private placement discounts and the cost of post-issue 
monitoring service has been examined in prior studies (Wruck, 1989; Wruck & Wu, 
2009; Liang & Jang, 2013), it remains unresolved whether the pre-issue monitoring 
mechanism has an impact on private equity discounts. Finding an inverse 
relationship between private placement discounts and corporate governance 
quality would suggest that non-participating shareholders are indeed better 
protected. 
Second, I ask whether corporate governance is related to the firms’ choice 
to issue a share purchase plan (SPP) with a private placement. An SPP, which is a 
type of public equity offering, provides existing shareholders the right to 
purchase newly issued shares at a discounted price. If an SPP is combined with a 
private placement, then the inequity in the treatment of non-participating 
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shareholders in private placements is largely reduced. Previous studies have 
focused on the role of asymmetric information as the primary determinant of the 
choice of private equity offering (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Wu, 2004; Akhigbe et al., 
2006; Barnes & Walker, 2006; Chen et al., 2010b). However, none of these studies 
have examined combinations of a private placement with a public offer. Barnes 
and Walker (2006), for instance, specifically exclude 436 issues that consist of a 
private placement and a public offer from their analysis. These combined offers 
represent about 50% of their final sample. This thesis thus aims to fill this void in 
the literature by investigating the motivation for firms to issue a private 
placement with a public offer. Since non-participating shareholders enjoy greater 
protection in firms with good governance, I predict a positive relationship 
between corporate governance quality and the likelihood that an SPP is offered 
with a private placement. 
 
1.3. Summary of Major Findings 
My analysis is based on a sample of 329 private placements issued by the 
top 250 (by market capitalization) Australian publicly listed firms over the period 
2002-2009. I sample only the top 250 firms since governance rankings from 
Horwath reports are available only for these firms. I employ OLS regressions and 
probit models to analyze the impacts of corporate governance quality on private 
placement discounts and issuing choice, respectively. Two measures of private 
placement discounts are used. The first is the percentage difference between the 
offer price and the issuer’s stock price 5 days prior to the announcement, and the 
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second is based on the issuer’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement. 
Results show that neither the governance index nor individual governance 
attributes obtained from Horwath reports and SIRCA database, respectively, are 
significantly related to the private placement discount. Although contrary to 
prediction, they are consistent with previous Australian studies that look at the 
impact of corporate governance quality on firm valuation (Matolcsy et al., 2004; 
Henry, 2008). The results are robust to a correction for potential endogeneity 
between governance and discount using the instrumental variable (IV) analysis.  
However, I find a significant positive relationship between corporate 
governance quality and the likelihood of firms issuing private placements with an 
SPP offer, consistent with predictions. Therefore, corporate governance plays an 
important role in corporate choice of financing decisions, consistent with the 
outcome model (La Porta et al., 2000b). My results also corroborate the 
information hypothesis in the context of Australian private placements where 
private placement investors demand a larger discount when issuing firms are 
associated with greater information asymmetry.  
In sum, my findings indicate that while good corporate governance may 
not be able to reduce the private placement discount, it does protect the interests 
of non-participating shareholders through the issue of an SPP offer which allows 
them to enjoy the same discount as participating investors. 
 
1.4. Thesis Layout 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related 
literature on private placement issuing choice and discount. Hypotheses are 
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provided in Chapter 3, followed by data and research method in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical results, and finally Chapter 6 summarizes the 
main findings and concludes the thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Private placements provide a convenient way to raise funds. Unlike public 
offers, private placements do not require the involvement of a lawyer or 
accountant, and need not be registered with the relevant authority until the 
required funds are raised. This chapter reviews previous research on the two main 
dimensions of private placements issuance. Section 2.2 discusses the relevant 
literature on firms’ issuing choice between a private placement and a public 
offering. This is followed by a review of previous studies on the discount on 
private placements in Section 2.3. A summary is provided in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2. Issuing Choice 
Previous empirical work on the issuing choice of equity has examined 
several determining factors, including information asymmetry, corporate control, 
flotation cost, and insider trading. The extant literature on the equity issue choice 
is summarized in Table 2.1. Appendix 1 shows the different issue conditions of 
SEOs across countries. 
There are two major choices for listed firms to raise equity: a public offering 
to the whole market or a private offering (placement) to a few selected investors. 
Akerlof (1970) suggests that the market will break down if the seller does not 
provide enough information to help the buyer identify the quality of the product. 
In the case of share issuance, adequate corporate disclosure can resolve the 
underinvestment problem, increasing the success of capital raising (Myers & 
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Majluf, 1984). Investors are more willing to participate in the share offering of 
firms with better information disclosure as the likelihood of misvaluation is lower 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999). This suggests that firms with a richer information 
environment (greater disclosure) are more likely to choose a public equity 
offering. Further, the marginal cost of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of public issues is lower for these firms than for firms with poorer 
disclosure. For the more opaque firms, issuing equity privately to a small group is 
a more cost-effective means of raising external funds.  
Lee and Kocher (2001) compare the characteristics of 73 private 
placements and 191 matched public offerings in the US from 1981 to 1990. Using 
both one-way anova and logistic regression methods, they find evidence that 
private placements are primarily conducted by smaller firms and by firms with a 
larger growth opportunity (book-to market ratio). Lo et al. (2010) suggest that 
smaller firms tend to experience a higher level of information asymmetry since 
the net profit from private information search decrease with firm size. 
Additionally, Lo and Wong (2011) argue that firms with a higher proportion of 
intangible asset relative to assets-in-place are subject to greater uncertainty in 
firm valuation. Thus, the findings in Lee and Kocher (2001) support the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. 
The information asymmetry hypothesis is also supported by Wu (2004), 
who uses a probit model to examine 330 equity offerings by high technology US 
firms from 1986 to 1996. She proposes that issuing firms with high information 
asymmetry are more likely to choose private placements because they want to 
lower the information production cost. Consistent with this argument, she finds 
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the likelihood of issuing private placements is positively correlated with the level 
of information asymmetry, which she proxies using analyst coverage, firm age,3 
institutional shareholding,4 and bid-ask spread.  
Using 329 placements and 193 rights offers during the period of 1995-1996 
in the UK, Burton and Power (2003) examine the choice of equity issue method 
between (private) placements and rights offers.5 Similar to the research findings 
in the US and consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, the 
propensity for issuing a placement is inversely related to firm size (market 
capitalization) and positively associated with the proportion of intangible assets 
(market-to-book ratio) among UK equity offerings.  
Extending the research of Burton and Power (2003) with a much larger 
sample size and more proxies for information asymmetry, Barnes and Walker 
(2006) compare the characteristics of 168 (private) placements and 600 rights 
offerings in the UK between 1989 and 1998. They also find evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between the level of information asymmetry and 
the propensity to issue private equity. Specifically, younger firms with smaller 
issue proceeds, higher growth (market to book ratio), and those firms that 
disclose the use of proceeds (a dummy variable) are more likely to issue a (private) 
placement than a rights offering.  
Jeppsson (2013) examines the choice of equity offering by European public 
                                                        
3 Firms with short listing period normally have fewer historical financial record at available, 
resulting in a high level of information asymmetry. 
4 Firms with higher institutional ownership are scrutinized more and better monitored than the 
others with lower institutional ownership, leading to a lower level of information asymmetry. 
5 In the UK private placement, the underwriter undertakes to purchase new shares from the firm 
at a given price and then sell them to selected institutions. Different from private placements in 
the US, the London Stock Exchange requires a minimum of 25% of the new shares in placements to 
be offered to market makers. Therefore, the public also has an opportunity to participate in 
placements and subscribe to the new shares. 
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biotechnology firms. His sample consists of 170 private placements and 86 rights 
offerings over the period 1995 to 2012. As most biotechnology firms are in their 
early life cycle, few of them are profitable with most investing heavily in intangible 
assets like R&D. Therefore, the information asymmetry problem is particularly 
evident among biotechnology firms and makes it difficult for these firms to raise 
debt capital. Consequently, equity financing is expected to be their main source of 
funds. By focusing on biotechnology firms, Su et al. (2014) can obtain unbiased 
results from tests of private vs. public offerings choice since the influence of debt 
financing on capital raising is largely minimized. He finds that biotechnology firms 
tend to choose rights offerings instead of private placements following 
product-related R&D disclosures as the information gap between biotechnology 
firms and external investors is reduced. This finding confirms Korajczyk et al. 
(1992)’s hypothesis that information asymmetry is time-varying and managers can 
reduce information asymmetry by releasing corporate information prior to equity 
issuing. Furthermore, consistent with other studies based on samples covering 
multiple sectors, firms in the biotechnology industry are also more likely to 
choose private placements when they have a higher level of information 
asymmetry, which is proxied by larger bid-ask spread, lower trading volume, and 
shorter listing age.  
The equity issuing choice can also be influenced by the ownership 
structure of the issuing firm. Controlling owners can enjoy the private benefits of 
control through their dominant power on voting (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Unlike 
public offerings, which are available to all shareholders, private equities are issued 
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to a small number of investors.6 Therefore, private placements are more likely to 
result in a dilution in the shareholding of the controlling owner who is not allowed 
to participate, reducing his/her private benefits since private equity buyers may 
become blockholders of the issuing firm and reap private benefits from 
controlling owners (Frankel & Li, 2004). In order to maintain their private benefits 
of control, public offerings such as rights offerings are more likely to be chosen in 
the presence of controlling owners in issuing firms outside the US.  
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) examine the effects of ownership structure 
on equity issuing choice for a sample of 136 private placements and 160 rights 
offerings by Swedish listed firms over the period 1986 to 1999. They find support 
for the corporate control argument. That is, in Sweden, family-controlled firms are 
39.8% more likely to issue equity through a private placement than a rights 
offering. Moreover, firms with a lower control margin (taken as the difference 
between the shareholding of the controlling party and all other blockholders) 
have a lower propensity to issue private placements. There is also support for the 
information asymmetry argument. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find high 
information asymmetry firms (younger firms and firms in financial distress) are 
more likely to issue private placements.7 
Lee and Wu (2009) take a different perspective in explaining firms’ equity 
issuing choice by looking at insider trading patterns prior to private placement 
announcements. For firms issuing private placements, a considerable body of 
                                                        
6 Outside the US, such as Sweden, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, private placements 
cannot be issued to firm insiders or large existing blockholders without shareholders’ approval. 
7 Financial distress, dummy variable, is commonly used to proxy information asymmetry as firms in 
financial difficulty may try to hide bad information through reducing corporate information 
disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
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research documents a positive market reaction to the announcement (Wruck, 
1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Hertzel et al., 2002), suggesting that such 
announcements convey favorable information about the future prospects of the 
issuing firm (Varma & Szewczyk, 1993; Hertzel & Rees, 1998; Goh et al., 1999). In 
contrast, firms issuing public offerings are on average associated with a negative 
market reaction, suggesting that public offerings convey management’s belief 
that the issuing firm is overvalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Brous, 1992). Therefore, 
firm insiders who are better informed than outside investors are likely to utilize 
this informational advantage and conduct intensive insider share purchases prior 
to announcing a private placement. Conversely, insiders are more likely to 
conduct intensive share sales prior to public offering announcements. Based on a 
sample of 2,248 private placements and 9,237 public offerings in the US over the 
period 1980-1999, Lee and Wu (2009) find that the pre-issue abnormal insider 
purchases are positively related to the probability of issuing private placements. 
In contrast, post-issue abnormal insider sales are negatively related with the 
probability of making public offerings. 
Another factor when considering the equity issuing choice is the flotation 
cost. Chen et al. (2010b) examine the role of total issuance cost in equity issuing 
choice for a sample of 2,087 PIPE transactions and 1,734 SEOs in the US for the 
1996-2006 period.8 Since one cannot observe what the offering costs would have 
been if the alternative offering method had been chosen, Chen et al. (2010b) 
                                                        
8 PIPEs are equity issues to a private group of professional investors without the need for public 
registration prior to the transaction. In private placements, shares are normally subject to a 2-year 
lockup period; shares in PIPEs do not have these resale limitations. In the US, SEOs are firm 
commitment offerings or standby rights offers where the total offering proceeds is guaranteed by 
underwriter in the former case; in the latter, the underwriter only guarantees the proceeds on any 
unsubscribed portion of the offer.  
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adopt a two stage structure choice model to obtain an estimated flotation cost 
for the alternative. They find that the likelihood of issuing PIPEs is negatively 
related to the difference between the total cost of the PIPE offer and the SEO. In 
other words, PIPEs are preferable to SEOs when the total cost of conducting 
PIPEs is lower and vice versa. As such, they argue that cost savings is also a key 
determinant of the equity issuing choice. Chen et al. (2010b) also confirm the 
information asymmetry argument of Wu (2004) as they find issuing firms with 
greater information asymmetry (lower total assets and analyst coverage, and 
larger bid-ask spreads) are more likely to conduct PIPEs. 
In contrast, using a sample of 4,098 seasoned equity offerings in Canada 
from 1993 to 2003, Carpentier et al. (2005) find the total costs of issuing private 
equity, both direct (remunerations of investment banker) and indirect (discounts 
on issued shares), are significantly higher than those of public equity after 
controlling for issue size, industry, and underwriter choice. However, their results 
support the view that private placements represent the last resort for issuing 
firms to raise external capital as they have to bear the higher floatation costs. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of literature on the equity issuing choice 
 
 
 
Author Sample Period
No of Private 
placements
Explanation Methodology Findings
Lee and 
Kocher (2001)
from US listed 
firms
1981-
1990
73 private placements 
and 191 public offerings
Information 
asymmetry
One-way 
annova 
Logistic model
Firms that choose private placements are much 
smaller and have more growth opportunity 
than those issue public offerings.
Burton and 
Power (2003)
from UK listed 
firms
1995-
1996
329 placements and 193 
rights offers
Information 
asymmetry
Logistic model
The propensity of issuing private placements is 
negatively correlated with firm size but 
positively associated with the proportion of 
intangible assets of issuing firms.
Wu (2004)
from US high 
technology 
firms
1986-
1996
360 private placements 
and 728 public offerings
Information 
asymmetry
Probit model
Firms with a high level of information asymmetry 
measured as short life,  little analyst coverage 
and big bid-ask spread are more likely to choose 
private placements
Cronqvist and 
Nilsson 
(2005)
from Swedish 
public firms 
1986-
1999
160 rights offerings and 
136 private placements
Corporate control 
& Information 
asymmetry
Nest logit 
model
In order to maintain the private benefits of 
control, family-controlled firms prefer rights 
offerings to private placements
Carpentier 
L'Her and 
Suret (2005)
from Canadian 
listed firms
1993-
2003
2,108 private investment 
in private equity PIPE and 
1,990 seasoned equity 
offerings
Cost Saving 
One-way 
annova & 
Cross-sectional 
regression
The private equity issue total costs including 
direct costs (remunerations of investment 
banker) and indirect costs (discounts on issued 
shares) are significant higher than public equity 
total costs.
Barnes and 
Walker 
(2006)
from UK listed 
firms
1989-
1998
600 rights offerings and 
168 placements
Information 
asymmetry
Logit model
Firms with short listing life, large book to market 
ratio are more likely to choose placements. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of literature on the equity issuing choice (continued) 
 
Author Sample Period
No of Private 
placements
Explanation Methodology Findings
Lee and Wu 
(2009)
from US listed 
firms
1980-
1999
2,248 private placements 
and 9,237 public 
offerings
Insider trading
Two stage 
regression
There is a significant signal about abnormal 
insider purchases prior to private placements; 
whereas abnormal insider sales appear before 
public offerings announcements
Chen Dai and 
Schatzberg 
(2010)
from US listed 
firms
1996-
2006
2,087 PIPE transactions 
and 1,734 seasoned 
equity offerings
Information 
asymmetry & Cost 
Saving
Structure 
choice model
The information asymmetry is a key determinant 
to the equity issuing choice between PIPE 
transactions and SEOs. Moreover, PIPE is more 
likely to be choose by issuing firms when the 
total flotation costs of PIPE is lower relative to 
SEOs
Armitage 
(2010)
from UK listed 
firms
2003-
2006
275 SEOs including 49 
rights offers, 142 open 
offers and 84 
placements
Cost Saving & 
Corporate Control
One-way 
annova 
Due to the low information production costs, 
placement is a good choice to opaque firms. 
When there is a large shareholder (over 40% of 
ownership) in the issuing firms, companies will 
choose rights offerings rather than placements. 
Jeppsson 
(2013)
European 
public 
biotechnology 
firms
1995-
2012
86 rights offerings and 
170 private placements
Information 
asymmetry
Probit model
In addition to information asymmetry proxies 
that have been examined in prior studies, 
Jepsson finds that biotech firms are more likely 
to choose right offerings when the progress of 
their R&D projects has been disclosed prior to 
equity issuing.
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2.3. Private Placement Discounts 
The extant literature on private placement discounts, as summarized in 
Table 2.2, can be traced as far back as 1971 when the SEC first reported an average 
discount of approximately 30% for placements of private equity in the US (Hertzel 
& Smith, 1993). More recent estimates are in the range of 10-25% (Brophy et al., 
2009; Wruck & Wu, 2009; Erhemjamts & Raman, 2012).  
Private placement discounts are also observed outside the US. While 
existing shareholders pay a premium for private placements in Singapore, private 
placement discounts of similar magnitude as in the US are found in Canada 
(Maynes & Pandes, 2011), China (Deng et al., 2011), Taiwan (Liang & Jang, 2013), 
the UK (Armitage, 2007), and New Zealand (Anderson, 2006). In Australia, the  
Institutional Shareholder Services (2010) reports an average private placement 
discounts of 12% for ASX200 firms in 2008 and 2009. 
One of the first empirical studies on the wealth effects of private 
placements is conducted by Wruck (1989) using a sample of 128 private 
placements issued by firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
American Stock exchange (AMEX) between 1979 and 1985. She finds that private 
placements are associated with a positive change in shareholder wealth in the 
short run, and this increase in firm value is significantly positively related to the 
change in ownership concentration of the issuing firms. Accordingly, she 
attributes the increase in firm value to enhanced monitoring of management by 
private equity purchasers who help to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Consequently, the agency cost of the firm is reduced. She therefore 
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interprets private placement discounts as compensation to private equity buyers 
for the expected cost of post-issue monitoring service. 
In a subsequent study, Wruck and Wu (2009) reexamine the monitoring 
hypothesis using a sample of 1,818 PIPE transactions with hand-collected data on 
changes in the board structure during private placement transactions over a 
period of 20 years (1980-1999) in the US. Private placements involve the issuance 
of a block of shares to a relatively small group of investors who do not have to 
already have a pre-issue relationship with the placement firm. Hence, as part of 
the placement contract, a new relationship between investors and the issuing 
firm may be created. The new relationship could involve an employment 
agreement (executives), a business arrangement (business alliance), one or more 
directorships (directors), or a 5% or greater shareholdings in the firm (i.e., 
placement investors become blockholders).  
The results show that shareholders enjoy an average 3.51% cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) during the announcement period if a new relationship 
between the issuer and investors is formed through the private placement 
agreement. The CAR for firms without any new relationship being created is lower 
by almost 3%. Firms that establish a new relationship with investors also have 
better operating profitability in the following two years, because the new 
relationship may serve as a mechanism to reduce agency costs by restricting 
post-issuing opportunistic behavior. Hence, investors who contribute to 
monitoring (thus improving the corporate governance) through forming a new 
relationship with the issuing firm require a larger discount. This is consistent with 
Wruck (1989)’s argument that private placement discounts compensate the 
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private equity purchaser for participating in the post-issue monitoring 
(governance) process.  
Increased ownership concentration may not always result in reduced 
agency problem and increased firm value through enhanced monitoring. 
Sometimes it may lead to an exacerbation of agency problem and a reduction in 
firm value due to entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988). In response to the latter 
possibility, Baek et al. (2006) examine the role of controlling parties in private 
placements by analyzing a sample of 262 private placements issued by chaebols in 
Korea from 1989 to 2000. The pyramidal ownership structure, which is a salient 
feature of many East Asian firms, allows firm insiders to exercise effective control 
over a company despite owning relatively few of its cash flow rights (Claessens et 
al., 2002; Lins, 2003). Ultimate owners of the pyramids therefore have a strong 
incentive to divert resources from firms low in the pyramid towards those high in 
the pyramid (Bertrand et al., 2002).  
Baek et al. (2006) observe that private placement discounts are 
significantly lower (13.5% on average) for issuers in intra-group deals (issued to 
another chaebol member firm) than for issuers in other deals. They suggest that 
when chaebol affiliated firms are involved in private placements, the offer price of 
private equity is set deliberately low in order to benefit the controlling 
shareholders of the chaebol group. In doing so, controlling shareholders dilute 
the wealth of minority shareholders and divert wealth towards buyers within the 
chaebol group. Hence, discounts on private placements provide an instrument for 
tunneling at the expense of minority shareholders rather than compensation to 
private equity buyers for their post-issue monitoring service. 
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Unlike Baek et al. (2006) who focus on the controlling shareholders, Wu 
(2004) examines the role of firm executives in determining private placement 
discounts for a sample of 229 high-technology firms between 1986 and 1996 in the 
US. Based on agency theory, she proposes that managers with only limited 
shareholdings in the issuing firm have a strong incentive to expropriate 
shareholder interests by purchasing private equity at a large discount. 9 
Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, her results demonstrate a positive 
relationship between the manager dummy (expressed as 1 if managers participate 
in the private placement and 0 otherwise) and private placement discounts. Wu 
(2004) further finds this positive relationship becomes more economically 
significant if managers involved in the private placement have a small initial stake 
in their firm. Her results indicate that private placement discounts become a new 
channel for managers to extract firm wealth.  
Barclay et al. (2007) take a different perspective in interpreting private 
placement discounts by focusing on the identity of private equity investors. 
Relying on press reports, they classify private equity investors into two types: 
active investors who have post-issue interactions with the issuing firms in terms of 
joint research and combined marketing, and passive investors. Based on a sample 
of 594 private placement transactions in the US between 1979 and 1997, they find 
private equity purchasers play a passive rather than an active role in monitoring 
management in 88% of the private placements examined. Private placements with 
passive investors have a 2% lower initial announcement return and 20% poorer 
                                                        
e In the US, managers and other firm insiders are allowed to participate in private placements 
without shareholder approval. 
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stock performance (expressed by CAR 120 days after the announcement) than 
firms with active investors. This indicates that the monitoring hypothesis can only 
explain a limited group of private placements (12% of their sample) when private 
equity buyers are actively involved in the post-issue operations of placements 
firms. The majority of private placement transactions are with passive investors 
who demand a larger discount on private placements as compensation, not for 
post-issue monitoring service but for offsetting the anticipated poor post-issue 
long-run performance (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). In this context, private 
placement discounts are viewed as compensation for post-issue entrenchment. 
The above noted studies focus entirely on the role of equity investors in 
terms of monitoring or entrenchment in private placements. The next group of 
studies offers a third possible explanation for private placement discounts based 
on the information asymmetry argument.  
Using a sample of 106 private placement transactions on the NASDAQ 
from 1980 to 1987, Hertzel and Smith (1993) find evidence for the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. Extending Myers and Majluf (1984) information 
asymmetry model from public offerings to private placements, they argue that 
private equity placements by undervalued firms with little financial slack can 
mitigate the underinvestment problem and resolve asymmetric information in 
such a way as to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities. Through 
private placements, managers can put intensive effort into negotiating with and 
convincing a small group of investors that the firm is undervalued and has good 
prospects. In doing this, private equity buyers become informed investors who 
can alleviate the information asymmetry problem and certify the market valuation 
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of placement firms by agreeing to purchase a large block of stock at discounted 
price. Consistent with their argument, Hertzel and Smith (1993) find their proxies 
of information asymmetry (book-to-market ratio, placement size, firm size, and a 
financial distress dummy) are strongly correlated with private placement 
discounts. Therefore, the discounts on private placements offered to professional 
investors can be viewed as a compensation for reducing information asymmetry 
and certifying the value of placement firms.  
Building on the work of Hertzel and Smith (1993), Anderson (2006) 
examines a sample of 70 private placements in New Zealand between 1990 and 
2002. Similarly, Tan et al. (2002) examine 67 private placement in Singapore over a 
period of eight years (1988-1996). In comparison to New Zealand, which has less 
regulatory control on private placements, Singapore imposes stricter restrictions 
on the issue size, discount level, and identity of the purchasers. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the institutional setting, both studies provide evidence that private 
placement discounts are positively associated with the level of information 
asymmetry of issuing firms, which is proxied by the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of private placement proceeds to their market value. In New Zealand, Anderson 
(2006) finds private placement discounts are positively related to the risk of the 
issuing firms, as measured by the variance of daily stock returns from day -230 to 
day -5 prior to the announcement of the private placement. 
Another explanation for private placement discounts is based on investor 
over-optimism. Hertzel et al. (2002) examine the long-term post-issue 
performance of a sample of 952 private placement transactions in the US 
between 1980 and 1996. In contrast to the significant positive abnormal return 
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during the announcement period, as reported by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and 
Smith (1993), they find both the operating performance and stock returns of the 
issuing firms decline over the following four years after the announcement. They 
attribute this reversal of announcement period value gains to market 
over-optimism about the future prospects of the issuing firms. While their study is 
not focused on private placement discounts, their results reveal that the 
discounted price of private equity represents the true value of the issuing firm, as 
certified by sophisticated institutional investors. Therefore, private placement 
discounts represent the extent of mispricing by issuing firms. 
Using a sample of 601 PIPE offerings in the US over the period 2002-2008, 
Glegg et al. (2012) confirm the inference of Hertzel et al. (2002) on the explanation 
for private placement discounts using a self-constructed mispricing index. The 
index is based on a scaled cross-sectional ranking of four mispricing measures: 
firm-specific mispricing, excess imputed value, average monthly abnormal return, 
and industry-adjusted market-to-book equity ratio. They find a significantly 
positive relationship between the discount on private placements and the degree 
of mispricing of placement firms. There is also a significant negative relationship 
between private placement discounts and the post-issue long-run performance. In 
other words, issuing firms that are more overvalued experience poorer long run 
performance, consistent with the certification argument that private placement 
discounts represent the level of firm mis-valuation. There is also support for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis as well. Issuing firms with a higher level of 
information asymmetry, as proxied by smaller firm size and lower institutional 
shareholding, have on average a higher private placement discount.  
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The last explanation offered by the literature is based on the liquidity of 
private equity offers. According to the SEC’s Regulation D of Rule 144, any 
privately placed equity of listed firms is subject to a two-year restricted period 
where private equity investors cannot sell the privately placed equity to the 
public.10 Silber (1991) examines a sample of 69 issuing firms in the US between 
1981 and 1988, and finds the price of private equity is 33.75% lower than that of 
publicly traded securities issued by the same firm. This finding led him to conclude 
that the private placement discount is due to the resale provision, and that it is 
considered as compensation for institutional investors for the illiquidity of private 
equity.  
Capitalizing on a natural experiment provided by a regulatory change that 
shortened the resale restriction period from 12 months to 4 months for private 
equity in Canada in 2001, Maynes and Pandes (2011) examine the impact of 
illiquidity on private placement discounts using a sample of 1,173 private 
placement offerings between 1993 and 2005. They observe a significant reduction 
on private placement discounts after the shortening of the resale restriction 
period. Consistent with Silber (1991) liquidity hypothesis, they find the private 
placement discount is negatively related to a regulatory change dummy, which 
takes the value of 1 if the placement was announced after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 
The results indicate that liquidity is a key determining factor of private placement 
discounts.  
 
                                                        
10On 12 February 2008, the SEC amended the resale restriction clause of Rule 144, which reduces 
the resale restriction period from 12 months to 6 months after the issuance of the privately placed 
equity (Maynes & Randes, 2011). 
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2.4. Australian studies 
The first study on Australian private placements, conducted by Liu et al. 
(2013), investigates the long run stock performance of 1,621 private placements 
issued by 193 Australian firms during the period 1992- 1996. Consistent with earlier 
studies in the U.S. and Japan (Alli & Thompson, 1993; Kang et al., 1999), he finds a 
significant stock price run-up 1-year prior to the placement but a significant 
negative 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) after the private placement,  
controlling for firm size, industry and survivorship. His findings indicate that 
managers of Australian placement firms take advantage of a window of 
opportunity for their overvalued stock, thus supporting behavioral finance 
predictions. 
Using a much larger sample (2,986 private placements) between 1993 and 
2001, Brown et al. (2006) examine the relationship between pre-placement stock 
performance, measured by misevaluation, and corresponding long run post-issue 
performance, proxied by BHAR and residual income. They confirm Liu et al. 
(2013)’s inference that managers time their private placements to exploit market 
misvaluation. In their later study, in addition to window of opportunity hypothesis, 
Brown et al. (2009) argue that long-run underperformance of placement firms is 
also due to their low quality internal governance structure. Based on a sample of 
11,055 Australian private placements issued between 1992 and 2006, they find a 
significant and positive relationship between firms’ governance quality and 
post-issue performance. Their findings are robust to different estimations of 
corporate governance quality and after correcting reverse causality. 
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2.5. Chapter Summary 
There are two distinct strands of research in the private placement 
literature. The first deals with the issue choice between private placements and 
other SEO methods; and the second examines the determinants of discount on 
private equity.  
Previous literature has made much progress towards understanding the 
equity-issuing choice between private placements and public offerings. However, 
in practice, companies raise equity capital through a combination of private 
placements and public offerings. Yet, no studies to date have examined these 
combined choices.  
The literature shows a significant positive relationship between the 
discount on private equity and the cost of expected post-issue monitoring service 
provided by private equity buyers (external governance). To best of my 
knowledge, the role of internal monitoring mechanisms such as board 
independence, board size, and frequency of board meeting in determining private 
placement discounts have not been addressed in the literature. Furthermore, 
early studies on private placements mainly focus on US firms, thus leaving many 
questions unanswered about what are the determinants of private placement 
discounts and corporate choice of issuing method in other countries like 
Australia.11 This thesis aims to fill the above three gaps in the literature.  
 
                                                        
11 Prior studies on Australian private placements (see for example, Chan (200); Brown, Gallery and 
Goei (2006) and Brown, Lee, Owen and Walter (2009)) mainly focus on the long-run performance 
of Australian private placements. In these papers, they partly examine the long-run performance 
of Australian private placements but do not investigate private placement discounts and choice of 
issuing method among Australia private equity issues.  
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Table 2.2: Summary of literature on private placement discounts 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Country / Sample Period
No of Private 
placements
Discount
Measurement of 
Discount
Explanation Findings
Wruck (1989)
 from NYSE and 
AMEX in the US
 1979 -1985 128 13.50% (P0-Prestricted)/P0
Monitoring 
Hypothesis & 
Implied liquidity
 The discounts on private placements are considered as 
the compensations to private equity purchaser for 
aligning interests of managers and shareholders. The 
discounts on private placements can also be attributed 
to the sale restrictions.
Silber (1991)
 from listed firms 
in the US
1981-1988 69 33.75% (P0-Prestricted)/P0
impaired 
liquidity
The private placement discounts is due to illiquidity (2-
year resale restriction based on the Regulation D of 
SEC's Rule 144).
Hertzel and 
Smith (1993)
from NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ in the US
1980-1987 106 20.14% (P10-Poffer)/P10
Information 
Asymmetric 
Hypothesis
Discounts on private placements reflect the due 
diligence and activities of private equity investors for 
reducing the information asymmetry of issuing firms.
Hertzel Lemmon 
Linck and Rees 
(2002)
from NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ in the US
 1980-1996 619 16.50%
(Poffer-Plast 
month)/Plast month
Certification 
Hypothesis
The discounted offer price of private equity reflects the 
true value of issuing firms. In turn, the private placement 
discounts measure the overoptimism in the market
Wu (2004)
US high 
technology firms
 1986-1997 338 19.40% (P10-Poffer)/P10
Entrenchment 
Hypothesis
Wu (2004) find that the private placement discounts 
tend to be higher when managers involved, as they only 
hold small initial shareholdings and have strong 
incentives to expropriate the wealth from existing 
shareholders through dilution effects.
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Table 2.2: Summary of literature on private placement discounts (continued) 
 
 
Author Country / Sample Period
No of Private 
placements
Discount
Measurement of 
Discount
Explanation Findings
Krishnamurthy 
Spindt 
Subramaniam 
and Woidtke 
(2005)
 from NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ in 
the US
1983-1992 397 19.44% (P10-Poffer)/P10
Certification 
Hypothesis
Even though issuing firms experience a significant 
negative long-run abnormal return following the 
placements, investors participating private placement 
can still have a normal return because of the discounted 
share price. It indicates that discounted price reflects the 
future share decline of issuing firms.
Barclay 
Holderness and 
Sheehan (2007)
from listed firms 
in the US
1979-1997 594 18.70% (Poffer-P1)/P1
Entrenchment 
Hypothesis
As managers are more likely to issue private equity to 
"friendly investors", issuing firms subsequently result in 
long-run underperformance.  The discounts on private 
placements are viewed as compensations to passive 
investors for managerial entrenchment.
Wruck and Wu 
(2009)
from listed firms 
in the US
1980-1999 1,976 11.33%
 (1): (P10-Poffer)/P10      
(2): (P-1-Poffer)/P-1
Monitoring 
Hypothesis.
When private placements investors provide strong 
governance mechanism on the issuing firm (e.g. gaining 
the directorship or becoming the executives of issuing 
firms), large discounts on private placements occur.
Brophy Ouimet 
and Sialm (2009)
PIPE transactions 
in the US
1995-2002 2851 14.12% (P0-Poffer)/P0
Information 
Asymmetric 
Hypothesis
Hedge funds prefer to demand large discounts on 
private placements in order to protect themselves from 
risks related to serve information asymmetry and poor 
operating performance of issuing firms
Glegg Harris 
Madura and 
Ngo (2012)
PIPEs in the US 2000-2008 601 8.74% (Poffer-P0)/Poffer
Certification 
Hypothesis
There is a significantly positive relationship between the 
private placement discounts and equity mis-valuation, 
endorsing the previous view that discounted price of 
private equity reflect the true value of issuing firms.
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Table 2.2: Summary of literature on private placement discounts (continued) 
 
Author Country / Sample Period
No of Private 
placements
Discount
Measurement of 
Discount
Explanation Findings
Erhemjamts and 
Raman (2012)
listed firms in the 
US
1990-2005 330 12.00% (P10-Poffer)/P10
Certification 
Hypothesis
Issuing firms using reputable investment banks provide 
lower discounts to private equity investors, suggesting 
that investment banks take a active role on certifying 
the value of issuing firms which subsequently results in 
low private placement discounts.
Tan Chng and 
Tong (2002)
issued by  listed 
firms in Singapore  
1988-1996 67 -13.73% (Poffer-P-30)/P-30
Information 
Asymmetric 
Hypothesis
Consistent with Hertzel and Smith (1993), Tan et al. 
(2002) find private placement discounts are large when 
placement size is large relative to the firm value
Baek Kang and 
Lee (2006)
non-financial firms 
listed in Korean 
Stock Exchange
1989-2000 262 13.50% (P0-Poffer)/P0
Entrenchment 
Hypothesis
Controlling shareholders in chaebol issuers tunnel firm 
wealth towards themselves through setting a 
deliberately low price in chaebol-affiliated placements.
Anderson 
(2006)
from listed firms 
in New Zealand
1990-2002 70 10.20% (Poffer-P-5)/P-5
Information 
Asymmetric 
Hypothesis
Issuing firms that are susceptible to asymmetry 
information demonstrate large private placement 
discounts.
Maynes and 
Pandes (2011)
listed Canadian 
firms
 1993-2005 1,173 19.00% (P-1-Poffer)/Poffer
impaired 
liquidity
The liquidity portion of private placement discounts has 
been reduced after shortening the resale restrictions
Liang and Jang 
(2013)
listed firms on 
Taiwan Stock 
Exchange and 
OTC Market
2002-2008 326 9.55% (P10-Poffer)/P10
Information 
Asymmetric & 
Monitoring 
Hypothesis
For firms traded in OTC market, the results demonstrate 
that information asymmetry is the main reason to the 
private placement discounts. In terms of firms listed in 
Taiwan Stock Exchange, both information asymmetry 
and monitoring explanations are supported.
Poffer: the offer price of private equity; Pn: the market closing price on day-n; subscript n represents the number of days relative to the private placement announcement 
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter develops three hypotheses based on information asymmetry 
and agency theory to examine whether corporate governance protects the 
interests of non-participating shareholders in private placements. The first two 
hypotheses, presented in Section 3.2, argue that corporate governance quality is 
associated with private placement discounts. Section 3.3 develops the third 
hypothesis which argues that corporate governance quality affects the issuing 
choice between private placements only and private placements with share 
purchase plan. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2. Private Placement Discounts 
3.2.1. Monitoring Hypothesis 
Strong corporate governance is thought to be essential in mitigating the 
agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control in 
publicly listed corporations. This separation creates an information asymmetry 
between shareholders and firm insiders as shareholders cannot directly observe 
management commitment or know the true economic value of the firm. Insiders 
therefore have the incentive and ability to pursue their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders instead of maximizing returns for all shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Unless appropriate governance structures are 
implemented, agency problems may arise, threatening the interest of outside 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000a). Due to the high risk 
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of potential expropriation, rational investors would demand a higher required 
rate of return when investing in firms with weak corporate governance (Chen et 
al., 2009; Pham et al., 2012). In order to successfully raise capital from 
(sophisticated) investors in private placements, firms with lower corporate 
governance quality therefore have to offer a larger discount on their newly issued 
shares to compensate investors who perceive them as risky investments.  
To ensure efficient usage of corporate resources, outside investors need to 
spend time and resources in monitoring insiders. I expect the monitoring cost to 
be higher in firms with poorer governance. As compensation for post-issue 
monitoring services, external private equity purchasers are expected to demand a 
higher discount on private placement (Wruck, 1989; Wruck & Wu, 2009) by poorly 
governed firms. The better the governance quality, the lower is the need/cost of 
external monitoring by outside private equity investors. Therefore, I predict the 
following: 
H1: Firms with better corporate governance are associated with a smaller 
private placement discount. 
 
3.2.2. Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
While potential investors have access to all publicly available information 
about the issuing firm, they have inferior knowledge about the internal operation 
of the firm, its economic potential, and the industriousness of its management 
and employees relative to insiders. This information asymmetry problem is 
particularly more pronounced for private placement issuers (Hertzel & Smith, 
1993). Hertzel et al. (2002) find that the newly issued shares are overvalued at the 
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time of the placement because managers engage in income-increasing earnings 
management through manipulating accounting accruals in order to attract 
outside investors and obtain favorable terms of contract prior to the placement 
(Chen et al., 2010a). Earnings management increases the adverse selection costs 
and makes it difficult for private equity buyers to value the issuing firm correctly.  
However, private equity buyers tend to be sophisticated well-informed 
investors (Brophy et al., 2009). In order to mitigate the information asymmetry 
problem and avoid purchasing a “lemon”, private equity buyers are expected to 
spend time and resources searching for information relevant to the valuation of 
the issue, and would require compensation in the form of a higher discount on the 
private placement (Anderson, 2006; Brophy et al., 2009). Accordingly, the higher 
the level of information asymmetry, the larger the discount required for private 
placement transactions. 
H2: Firms with a higher level of information asymmetry have a larger private 
placement discount. 
 
3.3. Private Placements Issuing Choice 
Agency theory suggests that self-interested managers and controlling 
shareholders have incentives to take actions that benefit themselves at the 
expense of outside shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In response to 
agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control in a 
corporation, corporate governance, with its system of checks and balances, is 
necessarily put into place to ensure corporate decisions are made in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
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Private placements are issued (often at a discount) only to a small group of 
investors who are selected by firm insiders (Wu, 2004). Existing non-participating 
shareholders do not get the discounted share price and at the same time also 
experience a reduction in both their ownership and future cash flow claims. The 
loss to non-participating shareholders increases with the size of the discount 
obtained by private equity purchasers and of the total proceeds raised by issuing 
firms in the private placement. 
In Australia, an SPP offer has been commonly used to address 
non-participating shareholders’ concern about wealth transfer in private 
placements (ASX, 2010). SPP is an SEO choice, which provides existing 
shareholders the rights to purchase newly issued shares at a discount on the 
market price without brokerage fees or stamp duty, but with a limitation on the 
total dollar subscription amount (Brown et al., 2008).12 SPPs can only be offered 
to existing shareholders who cannot participate in private placements which are 
offered to institutional investors.13 Accordingly, an SPP can partially protect the 
ownership of non-participating shareholders from potential dilution and at the 
same time, non-participating shareholders can enjoy the discount on the newly 
issued shares. Therefore, in the eyes of non-participating shareholders, the 
bundling of an SPP with a private placement provides greater protection to 
minority shareholders than a private placement of equity alone.  
Since firms with better corporate governance are more likely to make 
decisions that benefit all shareholders and not just firm insiders (La Porta et al., 
                                                        
12 Based on the 2010 ASIC regulatory guide 125 (Share purchase plans), each existing shareholder is 
allowed to purchase a maximum of AUD 15,000 newly issued shares under each SPP offer. 
13 However, the regulated maximum amount that can be offered to per existing shareholder over 
our test period is $5000.   
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2000a), in the case of equity issuing, the extraction of firm value through wealth 
dilution is less likely to happen when there exists a strong governance mechanism 
(Atanasov et al., 2010). Therefore, I predict that firms with better corporate 
governance are more likely to issue an SPP with a private placement. 
H3: Firms with better corporate governance are more likely to issue private 
placements with a share purchase plan. 
 
3.4. Chapter Summary 
La Porta et al. (2000a) define corporate governance as a set of 
mechanisms through which investors can protect themselves from any forms of 
tunneling. Issuing private placements creates an agency problem which may 
result in a large wealth transfer from non-participating shareholders to private 
equity investors. This thesis investigates whether corporate governance quality 
can affect this equity tunneling (extraction of value through financial 
transactions). Specifically, it tests whether issuing firms with better corporate 
governance provide a lower discount to private equity investors (the first 
hypothesis) and whether firms with better corporate governance are more likely 
to issue private equity with an SPP offer (an anti-dilution device) rather than 
private equity alone (the third hypothesis). In addition, I also test whether a larger 
discount is required to compensate private equity investors when the information 
asymmetry of issuing firms is higher (the second hypothesis).  
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CHAPTER 4 DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the data and research method used to test my 
hypotheses. It begins with a discussion of the sample selection procedures and 
data sources in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes both the regression models. In 
Section 4.4, I describe the measurement of the various proxies of corporate 
governance and information asymmetry, as well as the control variables. Section 
4.5 presents the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation matrix of the 
test variables, and Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.  
 
4.2. Data and Sample Selection 
The sample consists of all private placements made by the 250 largest 
firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) from 2002 to 2009. Over this 
period, there were a total of 1,075 private placements made in Australia, 
according to the Connect 4 database, which is my primary source of data on 
private placements. The DatAnalysis database is employed to verify the 
announcement date, size of each private placement, and other issue details of the 
private placements. 
Issues of convertible debt, preference shares, and options via private 
placements are excluded from the sample. Also excluded are issues in foreign 
currencies. After checking the purpose and structure of each private placement 
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transaction in Appendix 3B (New issue announcement document),14 I further 
exclude private placements that are announced simultaneously with rights offers 
and dividend reinvestment plans in order to remove the influence of other capital 
raising methods on share price movements. Also removed from the sample are 
private equity issued to managers as a result of the exercise of executive stock 
options or directly issued by firms to target companies as considerations for 
mergers & acquisitions; acquiring assets; interest repayment; remunerating 
service fees; and transferring liabilities from convertible bonds/notes to equities. 
These transactions are quite different from the typical private placements that are 
used to raise equity/fund from external institutional investors in the stock market. 
Using these filters, my final sample consists of 329 private placement 
announcements made by 197 unique Australian firms. Details of the sample 
selection process are provided in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Summary of sample selection 
 
                                                        
14 According to the ASX listing rule 3.10, an Appendix 3B announcement must be lodged by issuing 
firms with the ASX to apply for the quotation of additional securities upon the announcement of a 
new issue. 
Sample Selection Process Number
Initial Sample from Connect 4 Database 1,075
Less exclusions
No capital raising 32
Issued in other currencies 25
private placements of options, convertible securities, preference shares 137
Issued as considerations for Merger & Acquisition 295
Issued  as considerations for acquiring asset 36
Issued  as considerations for service payment or interest payment 30
Issued to managers due to the exercise of executive stock option 69
issued shares for converting firm liabilities to equity (e.g. convertible notes) 25
Issued simultaneously with Rights offerings or Dividend reinvestment plan 22
Issued to underwriters of other kinds of seasoned equity offerings 35
Errors: Appendix 3B documents not available 40
Total exclusions 748
Final Sample 329
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Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the 329 private placements by year of 
issue and industry sector. The private placements can be categorized into two 
groups based on the issuing choice: private placements only (Without SPP) and 
private placements with a share purchase plan (With SPP). I note the following: 
first, the number of private placement transactions and the amount of capital 
raised through this issue method bottoms in 2003 (27 transactions) and 2004 (at 
AUD 1.5 billion). The number of deals in 2003 is about half of that in 2002, 
following the burst of the internet bubble. During the period 2006-2009, the 
number of private placements reverts to its original level (that of 2002), with the 
total amount of capital raised approaching AUD 20.9 billion in 2009.  
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of sample private placements by year and industry, 
2002-2009 
 
 
Second, although representing only 40% of all private placement 
N Amount $M N % Amount $M N % Amount $M
2002 53 3,675.56 35 66.04% 1,275.94 18 33.96% 2,399.63
2003 27 2,898.53 18 66.67% 367.50 9 33.33% 2,531.03
2004 36 1,516.33 24 64.86% 562.12 13 35.14% 954.21
2005 32 1,689.55 20 62.50% 804.72 12 37.50% 884.82
2006 28 3,287.12 15 53.57% 1,199.42 13 46.43% 2,087.71
2007 36 4,786.27 25 69.44% 2,412.40 11 30.56% 2,373.87
2008 46 6,015.65 31 65.96% 3,353.47 16 34.04% 2,662.18
2009 69 20,973.68 29 42.03% 2,992.28 40 57.97% 17,981.40
Total 329 44,842.69 197 59.88% 12,967.84 132 40.12% 31,874.84
Consumer Discretionary 23 3,165.61 13 56.52% 1,572.54 10 43.48% 1,593.07
Consumer Staples 10 1,439.55 7 70.00% 1,163.58 3 30.00% 275.97
Energy 35 2,837.00 19 54.29% 1,107.52 16 45.71% 1,729.48
Financials 55 19,985.62 29 52.73% 2,391.01 26 47.27% 17,594.61
Health Care 38 4,448.90 23 60.53% 1,003.03 15 39.47% 3,445.87
Industrials 58 4,397.47 33 56.90% 1,395.93 25 43.10% 3,001.53
Information Technology 10 328.63 10 100.00% 328.63 0 0.00% 0.00
Materials 92 7,773.76 57 61.96% 3,616.21 35 38.04% 4,157.56
Telecommunication 2 115.00 2 100.00% 115.00 0 0.00% 0.00
Utilities 6 351.16 4 66.67% 274.40 2 33.33% 76.76
Total 329 44,842.69 197 59.88 12,967.84 132 40.12 31,874.85
Panel B: Distribution by Industry
Panel A: Distribution by Year
Without SPP Issued with SPPFull Sample
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transactions, private placements with an SPP contribute 71% of all capital raised 
through private placements. Third, the percentage of private placements issued 
with an SPP doubles from 30% in 2007 to nearly 60% in 2009. This reflects changes 
in the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) regulation on SPP 
issues in the late 2008 and June 2009, which respectively allow existing 
shareholders to purchase up to AUD 10,000 and AUD 15,000 worth of new shares 
in the SPP over these two years (ASX, 2010). Previously, the maximum limitation 
on individual subscription on SPP offer was AUD 5,000.  
Fourth, although the sample spans 10 industries, there is a higher 
concentration of firms issuing private placements with an SPP in the Materials, 
Financials, and Energy sectors. In contrast, firms in the Information Technology 
and Telecommunication Service sectors prefer to issue private placements 
without an SPP. 
For this final sample, data on corporate governance variables are obtained 
from the annual Horwath Corporate Governance Reports and Security Industry 
Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA). Data on other firm characteristics and 
stock price are sourced from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH), Bloomberg, 
Share Price and Price Relative (SPPR), and Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium. 
 
4.3. Research Method 
In order to evaluate the impact of internal governance mechanisms and 
information asymmetry on private placement discounts, I employ the following 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model: 
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𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝑏2𝐼𝐴𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖   (1) 
where b0 and u represent the intercept and residual term, respectively. Discounts 
is the discount on the private placement; CG is the corporate governance measure; 
and IA is the information asymmetry variable. To capture any unobserved 
heterogeneity over time and across firms, I include firm fixed effects F and year 
fixed effects Y. Firm fixed effects can isolate unobservable firm specific 
time-invariant factors affecting private placement discounts over the sample 
period, resulting in efficient and robust regression estimates. The year fixed 
effects captures unobserved macroeconomic and regulatory changes. 
To test determinants of the choice between issuing a private placement 
only and a private placement with an SPP, I run the following probit regression 
model: 
𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐0  +  𝑐1𝐶𝐺𝑖  + ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖  +  𝑌𝑖  +  𝑒𝑖   (2)  
where c0 and e represent the intercept and residual term respectively. SPP is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm issues a private placement with an SPP 
and 0 otherwise. The other variables are as defined earlier. All the test and control 
variables are lagged by one period so as to reduce potential endogeniety 
problems. 
 
4.4. Variable Measurement 
4.4.1. Private Placement Discount 
I use the closing price on the 5th day prior to the announcement of a 
private placement as the benchmark to measure the discount on the private 
placement, consistent with previous studies (Anderson, 2006; Anderson et al., 
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2006). Private equity buyers typically approach the issuing firm and assess their 
potential wealth gains from a discounted offer price before the announcement of 
private placements. Moreover, the stock price starts to reflect any new 
information about the private placement prior to the actual announcement. 
Indeed, Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) 
all agree that abnormal returns are significant on days close to the announcement 
date. By using the stock price on day -5, I can thus minimize the impact of the 
pre-announcement stock price fluctuation on the discount measure. The discount 
is calculated as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 =
(Closing price 5 days pre announcement − Placement price)
Closing price 5 days pre announcement
× 100%                                                                                             (3) 
 
4.4.2. Corporate Governance  
Following the adoption of various governance codes around the globe in 
2002, the ASX established the Corporate Governance Council (CGC) and 
subsequently released the ASX Corporate Governance Council Best Practice 
Recommendations (hereafter ASX Recommendations).15 The Recommendations 
define corporate governance as the framework of rules, relationships and 
systems, and processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled 
in corporations (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). It consists of 10 
principles and 28 recommendations for ‘good governance’. 16  The newly 
                                                        
15 The details of the 2010 ASX Recommendations are provided in the Appendix 2. 
16  In August 2007, ASX CGC published the second edition of corporate governance 
recommendation documents with 9 principles and 27 associated recommendations. The latest 
edition is released in June 2010, which includes 8 principles with 30 recommendations. 
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introduced ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 requests listed firms to report on the extent to 
which they comply with the best practice recommendations. There is an ‘if not, 
why not’ mechanism, requesting appropriate explanations in case of 
non-compliance with ASX recommendations. On this basis, firms in conformity 
with ASX Recommendations are expected to have higher corporate governance 
quality.  
Based on the ASX Recommendations, I employ several measures to proxy 
for the quality of corporate governance of private placement issuers. The first 
proxy is sourced from the annual Horwath-University of Newcastle Corporate 
Governance Report (hereafter Horwath reports). These reports publish the 
quality of governance for the top 250 (by market capitalization) listed Australian 
companies, computed using public information including annual reports and 
related party disclosure, starting from 2002.17 Each company is assigned with a 
5-scale governance score. Firms that are close in their compliance with the ASX 
Recommendations are given a five-star score, which is the highest attainable level 
of governance quality. Firms with a one-star score lack strong corporate 
governance structures, particularly in the areas of having an independent board 
of directors and the presence of board committees (Horwath, 2005).  
The Horwath reports also provide the relative rankings of companies 
based on their corporate governance practices. Since relative governance 
rankings are more informative than the star rating, I adopt the former measure in 
the analysis. The Horwarth relative governance rankings have also been used in 
                                                        
17 This yearly report is written by Jim Psaros and Michael Seamer at University of Newcastle 
Business School. http://www.newcastle.edu.au/school/business/research/horwath/ 
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Linden and Matolcsy (2004), Beekes and Brown (2006), and Liu (2012). Following 
Beekes and Brown (2006), I rescale the Horwath governance ranking to a range 
between 0 and 100. I denote the rescaled ranking as GOV Index. A higher GOV 
Index represents governance practices that are more in compliance with ASX 
recommendations. I also generate a dummy variable High GOV which is coded as 1 
if GOV Index is above the sample average and 0 otherwise.  
Rather than using a single governance index, I also construct individual 
governance attributes representing the corporate governance quality of issuing 
firms using data sourced from SIRCA. Following 2010 ASX Recommendation 2.1, 
my first measure is board independence (Board Indep), proxied by the number of 
non-executive directors on the board relative to the total board members. The 
effectiveness of the board’s monitoring role relies on its independence from 
management. To maintain their reputational capital, independent directors are 
more likely than executive directors to align with the interests of shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, opportunistic behavior of management is likely 
to be more restricted in the presence of a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board (Beasley, 1996). 
My second measure of governance is CEO Duality, following 2010 ASX 
Recommendations 2.2 & 2.3. It is a dichotomous variable, taking the value of 1 if 
the CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. Agency theory predicts 
that the concentration of power due to the same person taking both the positions 
of CEO and chairman reduces the effectiveness of board monitoring (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994). Separating these two roles (chairman and CEO) makes the CEO 
less likely to determine the agenda of board meetings, control the information 
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available to other board members, and dominate boardroom discussions (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). Thus, separation of roles can enhance the 
effectiveness of board oversight and thus reduce agency costs (Ferguson et al., 
2011). 
I also use the frequency of board meetings (Board Meet), which is ASX 
Recommendation principle 2, as a measure of the board’s diligence in discharging 
its responsibilities and duties. Board meeting frequency is expressed by the 
natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings held each year. Well 
organized board meetings are essential to directors making efficient decisions 
and enhancing the level of monitoring activities (Conger et al., 1998). Indeed, 
boards that organize more meetings demonstrate greater diligence in fulfilling 
their responsibilities and duties in supervising management, and this in turn is 
thought to lower agency costs and improves firm performance (Vafeas, 1999). Xie 
et al. (2003) also suggest that a board that meets more frequently provides 
directors more time to deal with managerial discretion like earnings management 
and ultimately reduce the level of information asymmetry. 
The ASX Recommendation principle 2 also provides my last corporate 
governance quality measure, which is board size (Board Size). Board size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the total number of board members. 
Previous research indicates that board size is related to directors’ ability to 
engage in monitoring and controlling managers (Jensen, 1993; Goodstein et al., 
1994; Beasley, 1996). On the one hand, having a smaller board size provides fewer 
opportunities for the appointments of independent directors on the board who 
can serve as a monitoring mechanism to limit managerial opportunistic 
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behaviours and protect shareholder interests (Klein, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, having a smaller board is more efficient as it can minimize 
problems relating to coordination, communication, and decision-making which 
commonly occur in firms with large boards (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996).  
 
4.4.3. Information asymmetry 
New investment opportunities are more difficult to value than 
assets-in-place. Therefore, if the investment funded by the private placement is 
large relative to the size of the issuing firm, private equity buyers would need to 
spend more time and resources to assess the value of the new investment and 
thus the firm value. As a result, private placement investors would demand a 
higher private placement discount to compensate for the information cost 
incurred. In line with Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Erhemjamts and Raman (2012), 
I include Fraction Placed, measured as the ratio of issue size relative to firm size, as 
the first proxy of information asymmetry.  
The book-to-market ratio (BM) represents the fraction of firm value that 
can be attributed to tangible assets-in-place. A low BM implies that intangible 
assets or more specifically growth potential occupy a larger proportion of firm 
value. Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that information asymmetry of issuing 
firms is more severe when firm value consists mostly of intangible assets. 
Therefore, private equity investors will require a larger discount for issuing firms 
with a lower BM. Consistent with Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Erhemjamts and 
Raman (2012), I use BM, expressed by the year-end ratio of book value to market 
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value of equity prior to the private placement announcement, as another proxy 
for information asymmetry. 
There are economies of scale to information production (Hertzel & Smith, 
1993). When the issue size is large, more equity purchasers have the opportunity 
to participate in the private placement transaction and assess the value of the 
firm. The larger the number of investors, the lower the information search cost.  
Similarly, larger firms are more likely to catch the attention of financial analysts 
and institutional investors who contribute to information production about the 
firm (Bhushan, 1989; Shores, 1990). The richer information environment of larger 
firms helps investors reduce the cost of information gathering. This suggests that 
larger firms are associated with lower information asymmetry so that the private 
placement discount will be lower. I measure Issuing Size and Firm Size by the 
natural logarithm of the proceeds from the private placement and the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization of the issuing firm at month end prior to the 
private placement announcement, respectively. 
Firms with low information asymmetry tend to have higher share turnover 
(Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001). When the information gap 
between uninformed and informed investor is narrow, uninformed investors 
become more confident that the market price is “fair” as it fully reflects all the 
relevant information about the firm (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). This in turn can 
increase the trading volume of the firm’s stocks (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Following 
Glegg et al. (2012) and Maynes and Pandes (2011), I employ Turnover, the average 
ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over the (-60,-1) days 
window prior to the placement to proxy asymmetric information.   
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Firms from the high technology sector invest more heavily in R&D projects 
and treat them as major assets for future income-generation. Unlike other capital 
or financial inputs, R&D projects are unique to firms. There is no organized market 
for R&D projects, which makes it difficult to form an equilibrium price that fully 
reflects the productivity and value of R&D projects. Therefore, Investors can only 
predict the productivity and value of firms’ R&D programs through observing 
performance from other peer firms (Aboody & Lev, 2000). Consequently, high 
technology firms with large R&D expenditures are associated with a higher level 
of information asymmetry about their valuation (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994), 
and are thus expected to have a larger private placement discount than other 
firms. Consistent with Glegg et al. (2012), Tech takes a value of 1 for firms in the 
information technology and telecommunication service sectors, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.4.4. Control Variables 
Private placement discounts 
I control for a number of variables in tests of the discount on private 
placements. The first is the risk of the issuing firm. Risk averse investors will 
require a larger compensation as the risk of the issuing firm increases. Following 
Anderson (2006) and Maynes and Pandes (2011), I proxy firm risk (Risk) by the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns from day -250 through day -20 
preceding the private placement announcement. 
I also control for the percentage ownership of blockholders (Blockholding), 
where blockholders are defined as shareholders with shareholdings in excess of 
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5%. In contrast to minority shareholders who own only a small proportion of firm 
capital, blockholders hold a larger stake in the firm and this gives them the ability 
and incentive to monitor management, thereby aligning the interests of managers 
and shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). For instance, blockholders can 
challenge management decisions due to their power to launch a proxy fight. 
Moreover, blockholders can nominate a person to represent them on the board 
to ensure that managers serve the shareholders. Consequently, blockholdings can 
influence the level of agency costs of issuing firms. 
In addition, Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that when single investors 
participate in private placements, the discount is on average significantly smaller. 
They argue that single investors are willing to pay a higher price for obtaining 
control rights because the control premium partially offsets the cost for searching 
information about the issuing firm. In line with Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Liang 
and Jang (2013), I generate a dummy variable Single which is coded as 1 if private 
equities are sold to one investor and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we also include a dummy variable Resource which is coded as 1 if 
issuing firms are from resource industries (GICS sectors 101020 and 151040) 
(Ferguson et al., 2011). It is reported that resource industry is a key pillar of 
Australian economy, which accounts for more than 6% of Australian economy in 
the past decade (Francis et al., 2009). Meanwhile, almost one-third of total listing 
firms in ASX are belonging to Resource industry. Given the importance of this 
sector in Australian economy, it is necessary to have Recourse as one of our 
control variables. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the measurement of all variables used in the private 
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placement discounts regressions. 
 
Private placement choice 
The tests of corporate choice of the form of private placement include a 
set of control variables that are correlated with the likelihood of issuing an SPP. 
Unlike right offers where new shares are offered to existing investors on a pro 
rata basis, an SPP is an equal entitlement independent of the number of shares 
that existing shareholders already hold. Given the upper dollar limit per 
shareholder, the aggregate amount that issuing firms can raise through an SPP 
depends on the number of shareholders (Brown et al., 2008). Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) show the importance of investor demand on the success of equity issuing. 
Given the same take-up ratio, firms with more shareholders can more easily 
receive the required capital and thus ensure the success of the capital raising in 
SPP. Therefore, I expect firms with a more dispersed ownership structure are 
more likely to issue an SPP. Following Brown et al. (2008), I control for ownership 
dispersion, which is proxied by the proportion of outstanding shares held by the 
non-top 20 shareholders (Non top 20). 
The pecking order theory of Myers (1984), supported by the theoretical 
foundation of Myers and Majluf (1984), states that to minimise asymmetric 
information costs and other financing costs, firms should finance investments first 
with internally-generated cash flows, followed by safe debt and risky debt, and 
finally by equity. In the context of SPP issuance, Brown et al. (2008) argue that 
firms that face limited financial slack (less cash holdings) have greater information 
asymmetry and thus have to rely on equity offerings for their source of external 
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funds. I therefore control for Current Ratio and Cash Ratio, where the former is 
measured by the current assets scaled by current liabilities, and the latter is 
measured by the receipts from customers less payments to suppliers and 
employees scaled by total assets.  
In addition, I control for Firm Size of the issuing firm, measured by the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market at month-end prior to the placement. 
Meanwhile, Resource dummy is also included.  
Table 4.4 summarizes the measurement of variables used in the issue 
choice regressions. 
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Table 4.3: Definition and sources of variables in cross-section regression 
 
 
 
Variables Descriptions Expected Sign Sources
Discounts (Closing price 5 days before announcement -Placement price)/Closing price 10 days after announcement*100% TRTH
GOV Index
Firms' governance ranking in Horwath annual report ; re-scale to range from 0 to 100, where firms with high values are 
reported to have strong governance mechanism (for balance date prior to private placement announcement)
- Horwath Report
High GOV Dummy variable; 1 is granted if GOV Index is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. - Horwath Report
CEO Duality
Dummy variable; 1 is granted if CEO is also the chairman; 0 otherwise (for balance date prior to private placement 
announcement) 
+ SIRCA
Board Indep Percentage of non-executive directors on the board (for balance date prior to private placement announcement) - SIRCA
Board Meet
the natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings held each year (for balance date prior to private placement 
announcement))
- SIRCA
Board Size the natural logarithm of the total board members (for balance date prior to private placement announcement)) ? SIRCA
Issue Size The natural logarithm of the total capital raised through private placements - Connect 4
Fraction Placed Number of shares offered in private placement/(shares offered +total outstanding shares) + Connect 4 & Bloomberg
BM Book value of total equity/Market value of equity -
Morningstar DatAnalysis 
& Bloomberg
Turnover
The average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days prior to the private placement 
announcement
- TRTH & Bloomberg
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private placement announcement - Morningstar DatAnalysis
Tech Dummy variable; 1 is granted if firms from information technology and telecommunication service sectors, and 0 otherwise + Morningstar DatAnalysis
Risk the standard deviation of firms' monthly relative returns over one year period prior to private placement announcement + SPPR
Blockholding total shareholding of those owners who occupy more than 5% of the issuing firm ? SIRCA
Single Dummy variable; 1 is granted if private equities are sold predominately to one investor and 0 otherwise - Appendix 3B
Resource Dummy variable; 1 is granted if private equities are issued by firms from resource industry (GICS sectors 101020 & 151040) ? Morningstar DatAnalysis
Panel C Information Asymmetry
Panel B Corporate Governance
Panel A Private Placements Discounts
Panel D Control Variables
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Table 4.4: Definition and sources of variables in logistic regression 
 
Variables Descriptions Expected Sign Sources
SPP Dummy variable; 1 is granted if private placement is issued with SPP; 0 otherwise SPPR & Appendix 3B
GOV Index
Firms' governance ranking in Horwath annual report ; re-scale to range from 0 to 100, where firms with high values are 
reported to have strong governance mechanism (for the balance date prior to private placement announcement)
+ Horwath Report
High GOV Dummy variable; 1 is granted if GOV Index is above the sample average; 0 otherwise. + Horwath Report
CEO Duality
Dummy variable; 1 is granted if CEO is also the chairman; 0 otherwise (for the balance date prior to private placement 
announcement) 
- SIRCA
Board Indep Percentage of non-executive directors on the board (for balance date prior to private placement announcement) + SIRCA
Board Meet
the natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings held each year (for the balance date prior to private placement 
announcement)
+ SIRCA
Board Size the natural logarithm of the total board members (for balance date prior to private placement announcement)) ? SIRCA
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private placement announcement + Morningstar DatAnalysis
Current Ratio current assets scaled by current liabilities (for the balance date prior to private placement announcement) + Morningstar DatAnalysis
Non top 20 Percentage of total shares held by on-top 20 shareholders (for the balance date prior to the private placement announcement) - SIRCA
Leverage Total liability scaled by total asset (for the balance date prior to private placement announcement) Morningstar DatAnalysis
Cash Ratio
receipts from customers less payments to suppliers and employees scaled by total assets (for the balance date prior to the 
private placement announcement)
+ Morningstar DatAnalysis
Resource Dummy variable; 1 is granted if private equities are issued by firms from resource industry (GICS sectors 101020 & 151040) ? Morningstar DatAnalysis
Panel A SPP Choice
Panel B Corporate Governance Measurement
Panel C Control Variables
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4.5. Data Description 
Table 4.5 provides summary statistics of my private placement sample. 
Noticeably, the median private placement discount in Australia is 5.08%, which is 
much lower than that reported in the US. For instance, Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
and Wruck and Wu (2009) report an average discount of 20.14% and 11.33% in the 
US during the period of 1980-1987 and 1980-1999, respectively. Discounts on 
Australian private placements range between -84.42% and 58.62%,18 and have a 
high standard deviation (12.71%). About 42% (131 out of 314) of the private 
placement transactions are simultaneously issued with an SPP offer, suggesting 
that issuing private equity with an SPP is quite common in Australia.  
The mean and median of GOV Index are 48.21 and 47.6 respectively. CEO 
Duality has a mean of 0.04; therefore, most Australian firms do not have a dual 
CEO/chairperson. The mean and median proportion of non-executive directors 
(Board Indep) in the sample are 0.73 and .075 respectively. The mean and median 
of board size of issuing firms are 7.26 and 7 directors respectively, with a range of 
3-18 directors. The mean and median of board meetings frequency within one 
financial year are 11.3 and 11 respectively, with a range of 4 to 33.  
Table 4.5 also indicates that the average proceeds raised from the private 
placements (Issue Size) by the top 250 Australian listed firms between 2002 and 
2009 is 147.61 million. The mean and median of total asset of issuing firms (Firm 
Size) are 1126.39 million and 369.85 million respectively, ranging from 3.18 million 
to 656799 million. This suggests a huge variation of firm size among Australian 
                                                        
18 If the closing price on day-5 is lower than offer price, private placement discount is negative. 
That is, premiums are viewed as negative discounts.  
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private placement firms. In order to reduce the influence of outliers, I take the 
natural logarithm of Issue Size, Firm Size, Board Size, and Board Meet in the 
following univariate and multivariate analysis. The BM ratio of issuing firms has a 
mean of 0.005 and a median of 0.004, indicating that the value of private 
placement firms consists mostly of intangible assets. The descriptive statistics of 
Fraction Placed show that on average issuing firms place about 8.8% of their total 
capital to private equity investors in each transaction, with a median value of 8.4%. 
The amount of private equity places ranges between 0.1% and 46.9% of total 
capital. About 4% and 34.39% of private placements in the sample are issued by 
high-tech firms and resource firms respectively. The top 20 shareholders hold on 
average over half the total issued capital, as shown by Non top 20 which has a 
mean (median) value of 0.365 (0.352).  
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of test variables 
Discounts measure the percentage difference between the offer price and the issuer’s 
closing price on day -5 to the private placement announcement date. SPP takes a 
value of 1 for private placements with an SPP and 0 otherwise. GOV Index is the 
Horwath governance ranking. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. 
CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the number of board members. 
Board Meet is the total number of board meetings in a year. Issue Size is the total 
capital raised via private placement. Firm Size is the market value of equity at 
month-end prior to private placement announcement. BM is book value of total 
equity divided by market value of equity. Fraction Placed is the number of shares 
offered as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the issue. Turnover is the 
average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days 
prior to the private placement announcement. Tech equals 1 if the issuing firm is from 
information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Risk 
is the standard deviation of monthly returns one year prior to private placement 
announcement. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares directly owned by all 
shareholders with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if private equities are sold 
to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Current Ratio is current assets scaled by current 
liabilities. Non top 20 Is the total percentage of shares held by non-top 20 
shareholders. Cash Ratio is the receipts from customers less payments to suppliers 
and employees scaled by total assets. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
Note: Board Meet data is available only from 2005 to 2009. Resource equals 1 if private 
equities are issued by firms from resource industry (GICS sectors 101020 & 151040) 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Test Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Discounts 314 5.08 5.56 12.71 -84.42 58.62
SPP 314 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
GOV Index 314 48.21 47.60 27.89 0.40 100.00
CEO Duality 311 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00
Board Indep 311 0.73 0.75 0.14 0.38 1.00
Board Size (unit) 311 7.26 7.00 2.40 3.00 18.00
Board Meet (unit) 198 11.30 11.00 3.89 4.00 33.00
Firm Size (millions) 314 11126.39 369.85 62104.46 3.18 656799.00
Issue Size (millions) 314 147.61 49.01 329.75 0.08 3000.00
BM 314 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Fraction Placed 314 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.47
Turnover 310 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Tech 314 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Risk 313 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.62
Blockholding 312 31.59 30.06 22.40 0.00 126.32
Single 314 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
Leverage 314 0.47 0.50 0.27 0.01 1.32
Non top 20 310 0.36 0.35 0.17 0.00 0.82
Current Ratio 302 5.04 1.48 23.83 0.12 401.96
Cash Ratio 291 -0.05 0.06 1.55 -26.11 1.57
Resource 314 0.3439 0 0.476 0.00 1.00
Panel A Dependent Variables
Panel B Corporate Governance
Panel D Control Variables
Panel C Information Asymmetry
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Table 4.6 displays the Pearson correlation matrix. As expected, private 
placement discounts are negatively correlated with the two information 
asymmetry measures, BM and Turnover. These findings are consistent with Hertzel 
and Smith (1993) and Erhemjamts and Raman (2012) who conclude that the level 
of information asymmetry in issuing firms does matter to private placement 
discounts. The discount is also positively correlated with corporate governance 
measures. Specifically, issuing firms with a higher governance index (GOV Index) 
and more board meetings (Board Meet) are charged a higher discount on their 
private equities, contrary to the monitoring hypothesis H1. I am intrigued by these 
findings and will investigate them further later.  
All the six corporate governance measures including GOV Index, CEO 
Duality, Board Indep, Board Size, and Board Meet are highly correlated with the 
likelihood of issuing a private placement with an SPP, providing some preliminary 
evidence that corporate governance quality does matter to the private placement 
issuing choice. The propensity to issue private equity with an SPP offer is positive 
for Leverage and Firm Size and significant at the 5% level and is significant and 
negative for Risk, Blockholding and Single at the 5% level. 
As expected, Table 4.6 reveals that the various corporate governance 
measures are highly correlated with each other. Significant relationships are also 
identified between the two measures of size (Firm Size and Issue Size), and 
between Firm Size and Leverage. To minimize multicollinearity problems, I will 
include only one of these variables in the regression at a time. 
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Table 4.6: Pearson correlation matrix of test variables 
Discounts measure the percentage difference between the offer price and the issuer’s closing price on day -5 prior to the private placement announcement date. SPP is 1 for private 
placement with an SPP and 0 for private placement of equity alone. GOV Index is the Horwath governance ranking. CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm of the total number of 
board meetings in a year. Issue Size is the natural logarithm of the total capital raised via private placement. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end 
prior to private placement announcement. BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Fraction Placed is the number of shares offered as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding after the issue. Turnover is the average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days prior to the private placement announcement. 
Risk is the standard deviation of monthly returns one year prior to private placement announcement. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares directly owned by all shareholders 
with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if private equities are sold to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Current Ratio is current assets scaled by current liabilities. Non top 20 Is the 
total percentage of shares held by non-top 20 shareholders. Cash Ratio is the receipts from customers less payments to suppliers and employees scaled by total assets. Leverage is total 
liabilities scaled by total assets. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Discounts 1
SPP 0.2107* 1
GOV Index 0.1193* 0.2827* 1
CEO Duality 0.0154 -0.1359* -0.2467* 1
Board Indep 0.0105 0.1004 0.2843* -0.0681 1
Board Meet 0.1598* 0.1500* 0.2847* -0.0732 0.0758 1
Board Size -0.0352 0.1950* 0.3316* -0.1850* 0.2039* 0.1935* 1
Issue Size 0.0095 0.4135* 0.2541* -0.0612 0.0012 0.1886* 0.3644* 1
Firm Size 0.0528 0.3351* 0.2625* -0.0455 0.0188 0.1872* 0.4000* 0.8308* 1
BM -0.1218* 0.0381 0.1309* -0.1435* 0.1377* 0.1022 0.2157* -0.0532 -0.1572* 1
Fraction Placed 0.0081 0.1751* -0.0198 -0.0812 -0.0055 0.079 0.0436 0.3485* -0.1207* 0.2544* 1
Turnover -0.1542* 0.0584 0.0272 -0.0472 0.018 0.0047 -0.037 0.1218* 0.1382* 0.0786 -0.0033 1
Risk 0.0226 -0.1132* -0.2672* 0.1613* -0.0559 -0.1676* -0.2074* -0.2193* -0.2796* 0.0082 -0.0232 0.2698* 1
Blockholding -0.0621 -0.1157* -0.2043* 0.1663* -0.0488 -0.1 -0.0936 -0.1142* -0.1299* -0.0276 0.0174 -0.2311* -0.0249 1
Single -0.3042* -0.2234* -0.1717* -0.0203 -0.0164 -0.0575 -0.0163 -0.1665* -0.2012* 0.1379* 0.1135* 0.0112 0.0878 0.0042 1
Current Ratio -0.0922 -0.0819 -0.1617* 0.0064 0.1166* -0.2387* -0.1693* -0.1458* -0.0607 -0.0034 -0.1018 -0.0824 0.0313 0.0459 0.0163 1
Non top 20 0.1114 0.0387 0.1922* -0.1073 0.2172* 0.1254 0.0286 -0.1275* -0.0782 0.0432 -0.1144* 0.1628* -0.0475 -0.5877* -0.004 0 1
Cash Ratio -0.0527 -0.0538 0.0366 -0.0059 -0.0029 0.1664* -0.0389 -0.0597 -0.0873 0.0503 0.0308 0.005 0.0237 0.0202 0.009 0 -0.051 1
Leverage 0.0804 0.2421* 0.3939* -0.1871* 0.1286* 0.2225* 0.4265* 0.3527* 0.3907* 0.0782 -0.0159 -0.07 -0.3204* -0.109 -0.081-0.2077* 0.0368 -0.0854 1
 60 
 
4.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the data, sample selection, variable measurements, 
and research method. Based on the top 250 firms listed on the ASX between 2002 
and 2009, I collect data for a final sample of 329 private placements. Corporate 
governance quality is measured by a composite index sourced from the Horwath 
governance report, as well as individual governance mechanisms sourced from 
SIRCA: board independence, CEO duality, board size, and board meeting 
frequency. Information asymmetry is proxied by six different variables: firm size, 
issue size, fraction placed (the ratio of issue size relative to firm size), 
book-to-market ratio, average turnover ratio, and a high-technology industry 
dummy. I employ OLS model to test both the monitoring and information 
asymmetry hypotheses in the context of private placement discounts. A probit 
regression is used to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and private placement issuing choice. 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the empirical results. Section 5.2 reports the results 
on the determinants of private placement discounts. Results from both univariate 
and multivariate analyses are discussed. Section 5.3 provides the results from 
tests of private placement issuing choice, focusing on corporate governance 
quality as the main explanatory variable. Finally, Section 5.4 summarizes the 
empirical results. 
 
5.2. Private placement discounts 
5.2.1. Univariate Analysis 
To test whether corporate governance quality and the level of information 
asymmetry influence the private placement discount, I initially conduct univariate 
tests of difference in firm characteristics between private placements with “high” 
and “low” discounts, using the median discount as the discriminating value. 
Results from both parametric t- and non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests are 
reported in Table 5.1. 
Panel A of Table 5.1 shows that, on average, private placements with a high 
discount are issued by better governed firms. Specifically, the Horwath 
governance index for the high discount private placement group is 51.37%, which 
is both statistically and economically significantly higher than the 43.20% for the 
group of private placements with a low discount. Similar results are found using 
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High GOV. These univariate results are contrary to hypothesis H1, which predicts 
firms with better corporate governance quality have a lower discount on their 
private placement. We will address this issue further in the multiple regressions. 
Panel B of Table 5.1 shows that Fraction Placed is significantly lower for the 
low discount group. Therefore, consistent with the information asymmetry 
hypothesis H2 and past studies (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Maynes & Pandes, 2011; 
Erhemjamts & Raman, 2012), firms that privately place a smaller portion of their 
issued capital incur lower information cost and are thus discounted less. 
 In line with Anderson (2006), I find private equity investors demand a 
larger discount from riskier firms, as measured by the higher variance of 
pre-placement returns (Risk), as shown in Panel C. In addition, when private 
equities are predominately sold to one investor rather than a group of investors, 
the private placement discount is significantly lower, consistent with Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) and Liang and Jang (2013). 
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Table 5.1: Univariate test of mean and median difference in variables 
between low and high private placement discounts, 2002-2009 
High and low private placement discounts are identified using the sample median as the cutoff. GOV Index 
is the Horwath governance ranking. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality 
equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of board meetings in a year. Issue Size is the natural logarithm of the total capital 
raised via private placement. BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Fraction 
Placed is the number of shares offered as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the issue. Firm 
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private placement 
announcement. Turnover is the average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over 
(-60,-1) days prior to the private placement announcement. Tech equals 1 if the issuing firm is from 
information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly returns one year prior to private placement announcement. Blockholding is the total 
percentage of shares directly owned by all shareholders with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if 
private equities are sold to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Resource equals 1 if private equities are 
issued by firms from resource industry (GICS code 101020 & 151040) and 0 otherwise. P-values for t-test 
(mean) and Mann-Whitney test (median) are reported in the last two columns. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
  
N Mean Median N Mean Median t-test Mann Whitney
GOV Index 158 45.09 43.20 156 51.37 49.20 0.046** 0.053*
High GOV 158 0.46 0.00 161 0.55 1.00 0.083* 0.083*
CEO Duality 158 0.05 0.00 153 0.03 0.00 0.261 0.263
Board Indep 158 0.73 0.75 153 0.72 0.75 0.633 0.685
Board Size 158 1.92 1.95 153 1.94 1.95 0.481 0.724
Board Meet 102 2.35 2.40 96 2.39 2.40 0.319 0.391
Issue Size 158 17.67 17.73 156 17.63 17.63 0.818 0.554
BM 158 0.01 0.00 156 0.01 0.00 0.844 0.861
Fraction Placed 158 0.08 0.07 156 0.10 0.09 0.029** 0.002***
Firm Size 158 24.91 24.76 156 24.78 24.62 0.409 0.173
Turnover 155 0.00 0.00 155 0.00 0.00 0.420 0.426
Tech 158 0.04 0.00 161 0.03 0.00 0.736 0.735
Risk 157 0.12 0.10 156 0.14 0.13 0.029** 0.011**
Blockholding 158 33.22 30.04 154 29.91 30.06 0.193 0.221
Single 158 0.15 0.00 161 0.07 0.00 0.030** 0.029**
Resource 158 0.35 0.00 156 0.34 0.00 0.8766 0.8763
Panel A Corporate Governance
Panel B Information Asymmetry
Panel C Control Variable
Low discount High discount p values of different test
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5.2.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5.2 provides the OLS regression results for the determinants of 
private placement discounts, measured by the percentage difference between 
the offer price and the issuer’s closing price on day -5 prior to the private 
placement announcement. Each of the six corporate governance measures and 
six information asymmetry proxies is included separately in the regression with 
the set of control variables to test both the monitoring hypothesis (H1) and 
information hypothesis (H2) in a multivariate setting.  
I argue that issuing firms with good corporate governance quality already 
have efficient monitoring mechanisms in place and thus private placement 
investors are expected to demand a lower discount as compensation for their 
post-issuing monitoring service. Therefore, based on the monitoring hypothesis of 
H1, I predict a negative relationship between private placement discounts and 
corporate governance quality. However, this prediction is not supported by the 
regression results. Specification (1) shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between GOV Index and Discounts, indicating that the private 
placement issued by better governed firms (higher Horwath governance index) is 
on average discounted more, contrary to my prediction. However, this 
relationship is not economically important, with a one unit improvement on the 
Horwath governance index resulting in a mere 0.05% increase in the private 
placement discount.  
Using the individual governance mechanisms does not materially change 
the above conclusion. Board Meet is significantly (at the 10% level) and positively 
related to Discounts in specifications (9) and (10), suggesting that issuing firms 
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with more board meetings experience a larger change in private placement 
discount. None of the remaining governance mechanisms, i.e., board 
independence (Board Indep), whether CEO and chairman positions are held by the 
same person (CEO Duality), and board size (Board Size) are statistically significantly 
related to private placement discount. 
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Table 5.2: Cross-section OLS regression of the determinants of private placement discounts in Australia between 2002 and 2009 
The dependent variable Discounts is the percentage difference between the offer price and the issuer’s closing price on day -5 prior to the private placement announcement date. GOV 
Index is the Horwath governance ranking. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings in 
a year. Issue Size is the natural logarithm of the total capital raised via private placement. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private 
placement announcement. BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Fraction Placed is the number of shares offered as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding after the issue. Turnover is the average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days prior to the private placement announcement. Tech 
equals 1 if the issuing firm is from information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Risk is the standard deviation of monthly returns one year prior to 
private placement announcement. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares directly owned by all shareholders with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if private equities are 
sold to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Debt payment equals 1 if private equity is used to repay debt and 0 otherwise. Resource equals 1 if private equities are issued by firms from 
resource industry (GICS code 101020 & 151040) and 0 otherwise. P-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
GOV Index 0.0502* 0.0424
(1.72) (1.41)
High GOV 1.318 1.142
(1.05) (0.89)
CEO Duality 1.274 1.128
(0.43) (0.39)
Board Indep -0.291 -0.107
(-0.06) (-0.02)
Board Meet 7.083* 6.801
(1.69) (1.60)
Board Size -2.689 -4.291
(-0.73) (-1.05)
Issue Size -1.082* -0.978* -0.881 -0.876 -1.156 -0.623 -0.936
(-1.85) (-1.68) (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.29) (-0.93) (-1.59)
Firm Size -0.235 -0.170 -0.114 -0.111 -0.388 0.369 -0.145
(-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.47) (0.41) (-0.21)
Panel A Corporate Governance
Panel B Information Asymmetry
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Table 5.2: Cross-section OLS regression of the determinants of private placement discounts in Australia between 2002 and 2009 
(continued) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
BM -370.3** -337.1* -352.8* -319.0* -338.2* -308.9* -341.6* -312.4* -242.4 -179.2 -309.3* -260.4 -341.0* -309.5*
(-2.10) (-1.94) (-1.96) (-1.78) (-1.85) (-1.69) (-1.90) (-1.74) (-0.60) (-0.45) (-1.68) (-1.39) (-1.88) (-1.72)
Fraction Placed 33.98** 22.42 31.95** 21.57 32.27** 23.12 32.07** 22.99 33.03* 22.76 29.97** 24.91 31.78** 21.86
(2.12) (1.56) (2.05) (1.49) (2.04) (1.56) (2.05) (1.57) (1.82) (1.43) (2.05) (1.61) (2.04) (1.50)
Turnover 616.4 549.7 616.4 549.0 686.8 618.5 681.0 613.0 1474.1* 1381.1* 680.6 603.2 665.3 592.3
(0.94) (0.86) (0.92) (0.84) (1.03) (0.95) (1.02) (0.94) (1.86) (1.77) (1.03) (0.95) (1.00) (0.92)
Tech 7.303 4.655 6.631 7.205* 6.235 6.843* 6.115 6.720 -4.363 -3.841 5.017 4.900 5.980 6.623
(1.65) (0.97) (1.55) (1.70) (1.53) (1.68) (1.45) (1.60) (-0.91) (-0.83) (1.09) (1.04) (1.43) (1.59)
Risk 5.044 9.703 2.218 6.616 0.529 5.120 1.068 5.603 -0.124 3.981 0.889 5.849 0.323 4.912
(0.44) (0.85) (0.18) (0.56) (0.04) (0.41) (0.09) (0.47) (-0.01) (0.32) (0.07) (0.49) (0.03) (0.41)
Blockholding -0.0129 -0.0150 -0.0217 -0.0183 -0.0225 -0.0186 -0.0211 -0.0173 0.0315 0.0322 -0.0214 -0.0182 -0.0234 -0.0198
(-0.47) (-0.50) (-0.85) (-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.83) (-0.67) (0.82) (0.83) (-0.84) (-0.70) (-0.93) (-0.77)
Single -11.19** -10.66** -11.47** -10.84** -11.57** -10.97** -11.58** -10.98** -19.99*** -19.51*** -11.33** -10.62** -11.57** -10.94**
(-2.44) (-2.35) (-2.44) (-2.31) (-2.45) (-2.33) (-2.45) (-2.33) (-3.34) (-3.21) (-2.49) (-2.36) (-2.45) (-2.32)
Debt payment -0.101 -0.268 -0.135 -0.269 -0.0615 -0.182 -0.107 -0.221 -3.007 -2.849 0.0263 0.0141 -0.142 -0.271
(-0.07) (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.18) (-0.04) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-0.15) (-1.39) (-1.34) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.09) (-0.18)
Resource -1.788 -0.424 -2.261 -1.899 -1.969 -1.489 -1.980 -1.499 -1.510 -1.258 -2.384 -2.117 -2.581 -2.182
(-0.71) (-0.18) (-0.92) (-0.72) (-0.81) (-0.57) (-0.82) (-0.58) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.91) (-0.76) (-1.08) (-0.84)
Constant 15.11 6.177 16.63 3.984 16.04 3.442 16.24 3.514 1.790 -7.686 17.83 1.197 17.33 4.598
(1.41) (0.35) (1.54) (0.23) (1.48) (0.20) (1.48) (0.21) (0.12) (-0.40) (1.52) (0.07) (1.60) (0.26)
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 308 308 308 308 307 307 307 307 195 195 307 307 308 308
adjusted R2 0.122 0.115 0.116 0.108 0.114 0.108 0.114 0.107 0.251 0.244 0.116 0.115 0.117 0.110
Panel C Control Variable
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One possible explanation for the weak relationship between private 
placement discounts and corporate governance quality is that I focus only on the 
top 250 ASX firms. Conceivably, these are better governed firms; the descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.5 show a tight distribution of the governance measures, as 
portrayed by the low standard deviation. The observed lack of variation in the 
governance measures may plausibly explain why I do not find convincing evidence 
to support the importance of corporate governance in the determination of 
private placement discounts. 
Alternatively, it may well be that governance is not a determining factor of 
private placement discounts. In theory, corporate governance is argued to play a 
pivotal role in mitigating agency conflicts (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), resulting in 
higher firm valuation (Gompers et al., 2003; Brown & Caylor, 2006). In practice, 
however, because of information asymmetry, external investors may find it hard 
to determine whether firms implement the corporate governance mechanisms 
substantially or symbolically (Kouwenberg & Phunnarungsi, 2013). Therefore, 
firms that indicate compliance with the codes of governance may not necessarily 
have the monitoring mechanisms in place. 
Alternative explanations are reverse causality with increased monitoring 
due to large discounts leading to better firm level governance, and selection bias 
with better governed firms choosing rights offering instead of private placements.  
I address these issues in the robustness section.     
Next, I turn to the results for the relationship between information 
asymmetry (as proxied by Issue Size, Firm Size, BM, Fraction Placed, Turnover, and 
Tech) and private placement discounts. In line with prior studies (Hertzel & Smith, 
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1993; Erhemjamts & Raman, 2012; Glegg et al., 2012), I find that in most 
specifications, the coefficients on Book to Market ratio (BM) are negative (on 
average -308) and significant at the 1o% level, indicating that a 1% increase in the  
tangible asset component of firm value brings about a 3.08% reduction in private 
placement discount. Meanwhile, the coefficient on Fraction Placed is positive (on 
average 28) and significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests that a 1% increase 
in the ratio of placement size (in shares) relative to total shares outstanding leads 
to a 0.28% increase in private placement discount. Firms with a higher proportion 
of intangible assets and place a larger fraction of private equities face higher 
information costs because intangible assets and new investment opportunities 
are relatively more difficult to value. Accordingly, investors would demand a 
larger discount as compensation, reflecting the information search costs. These 
findings are consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis of H2. 
Tech has a positive and significant coefficient in specifications (1), (4), and 
(6), consistent with high technology firms having greater information asymmetry 
and thus having their private placements discounted more (Glegg et al., 2012). 
However, Turnover is positively related to private placement discounts and has a 
marginally significant coefficient in specifications (9) and (10).19 Contrary to the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, this finding indicates that issuing firms with 
higher trading volume prior to equity raising have a larger private placement 
discount. Similar results are also found in New Zealand (Anderson et al., 2006) and 
Canada (Maynes & Pandes, 2011). The other information asymmetry variables are 
                                                        
19 Specifications (9) and (10) only doesn’t covers the full samples period as the board meeting 
frequency data is only available between 2005 and 2009. 
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statistically insignificantly related to private placement discounts. 
Of the control variables, I find robust and significant results only for Single, 
which is negative and significant at the 5% level in all specifications. Therefore, 
when private equities are sold to just one investor instead of a group of investors, 
they are discounted less presumably due to the control premium that the single 
private investor can enjoy. This is consistent with the findings in Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) and Liang and Jang (2013). 
 
5.2.3. Robustness 
To test the robustness of the above results in Section 5.2.2, I also measure 
the private placement discount as the percentage difference between the offer 
price and the issuer’s closing price on day -1 before the private placement 
announcement date, following Brown et al. (2006), Wruck and Wu (2009), and 
Maynes and Pandes (2011).20  
Table 5.3 shows that the results are robust to this alternative measure. 
That is, the information asymmetry hypothesis (H2) is supported, i.e., there is a 
larger discount on private placements issued by firms with greater information 
asymmetry. Specifically, except for Turnover and Firm Size, Issue Size, BM, Fraction 
Placed and Tech all have the expected sign and are significant.  
Consistent with the above multivariate analysis, there is little evidence 
                                                        
20 The closing price on Day +10 is not adopted, because private equity buyers are interested in 
assessing the risk and return of their private placement investment based on the offer price and 
recent stock price. Unlike the US private equity market, the Australian regulator does not impose a 
resale restriction on private placements, which allows investors to sell their newly acquired 
equities on-market and to realize their profit immediately. Therefore, recent share prices provide 
more important information on the likely return the investor can obtain than the post-issuing 
price. 
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supporting the monitoring hypothesis (H1). Specifications (9) and (10) indicate 
that firms with more frequent board meetings are significantly correlated with 
larger private placement discounts, contrary to hypothesis H1. Similar conclusion 
is found for GOV Index, High GOV and Board Indep. 
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Table 5.3: Robustness tests on the determinants of private placement discounts in Australia between 2002 and 2009, using day -1 closing 
stock price in calculating Discounts 
The dependent variable Discounts is the percentage difference between the offer price and the issuer’s closing price on day -1 prior to the private placement announcement date. GOV 
Index is the Horwath governance ranking. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings in 
a year. Issue Size is the natural logarithm of the total capital raised via private placement. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private 
placement announcement. BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Fraction Placed is the number of shares offered as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding after the issue. Turnover is the average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days prior to the private placement announcement. Tech 
equals 1 if the issuing firm is from information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Risk is the standard deviation of monthly returns one year prior to 
private placement announcement. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares directly owned by all shareholders with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if private equities are 
sold to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Debt payment equals 1 if private equity is used to repay debt and 0 otherwise. Resource equals 1 if private equities are issued by resource firms 
and 0 otherwise. P-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
GOV Index 0.0565 0.0504
(1.35) (1.19)
High GOV 1.465 1.291
(1.10) (0.96)
CEO Duality 5.130 4.984
(1.46) (1.44)
Board Indep 0.928 1.105
(0.17) (0.20)
Board Meet 12.50* 12.34*
(1.74) (1.69)
Board Size -5.055 -6.534
(-0.95) (-1.12)
Issue Size -1.194* -1.077* -0.982 -0.955 -1.574* -0.484 -1.030*
(-1.86) (-1.75) (-1.59) (-1.55) (-1.69) (-0.74) (-1.67)
Total Assets -0.460 -0.367 -0.313 -0.296 -0.940 0.432 -0.339
(-0.73) (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-1.00) (0.48) (-0.54)
Panel A Corporate Governance
Panel B Information Asymmetry
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Table 5.3: Robustness tests on the determinants of private placement discounts in Australia between 2002 and 2009, using Day -1 closing 
stock price in calculating Discounts (continued) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
BM -535.2*** -501.1*** -515.4*** -483.9*** -487.2*** -460.2** -506.2*** -479.7*** -615.3 -567.9 -441.7** -397.2** -502.3*** -473.1***
(-3.11) (-2.95) (-2.91) (-2.75) (-2.68) (-2.53) (-2.86) (-2.72) (-1.56) (-1.43) (-2.38) (-2.07) (-2.80) (-2.64)
Fraction Placed 46.36** 32.95** 44.08** 32.19** 45.07** 34.40** 44.16** 33.82** 51.84** 35.98** 40.28** 36.77** 43.88** 32.52**
(2.39) (2.04) (2.39) (1.98) (2.40) (2.06) (2.40) (2.05) (2.39) (2.12) (2.59) (2.05) (2.38) (1.98)
Turnover 1166.4* 1107.9* 1167.0* 1109.7 1266.5* 1208.4* 1235.5* 1178.4* 2035.8** 1965.7** 1240.1* 1167.9* 1221.4* 1158.7*
(1.71) (1.70) (1.67) (1.65) (1.78) (1.76) (1.74) (1.73) (2.07) (1.99) (1.76) (1.76) (1.73) (1.71)
Tech 8.355 8.558 7.589 8.155 7.585 8.185* 6.908 7.494 -11.37* -10.79* 4.980 4.841 6.866 7.497
(1.40) (1.35) (1.35) (1.46) (1.54) (1.66) (1.26) (1.37) (-1.77) (-1.73) (0.81) (0.78) (1.26) (1.38)
Risk -7.370 -3.802 -10.58 -6.807 -14.06 -10.10 -11.65 -7.793 -14.16 -10.95 -12.16 -7.558 -12.68 -8.733
(-0.50) (-0.26) (-0.64) (-0.43) (-0.77) (-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.48) (-0.68) (-0.51) (-0.69) (-0.47) (-0.73) (-0.53)
Blockholding 0.0240 0.0259 0.0141 0.0174 0.00902 0.0128 0.0151 0.0186 0.0822 0.0831 0.0143 0.0172 0.0122 0.0156
(0.63) (0.61) (0.42) (0.51) (0.28) (0.38) (0.46) (0.55) (1.48) (1.47) (0.43) (0.51) (0.37) (0.46)
Single -12.59* -12.01* -12.91* -12.31* -13.00* -12.44* -13.02* -12.47* -22.04** -21.61** -12.57* -11.93* -13.02* -12.43*
(-1.85) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.78) (-1.83) (-1.78) (-2.32) (-2.26) (-1.88) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.78)
Debt payment 0.562 0.411 0.524 0.389 0.734 0.612 0.566 0.454 -3.423 -3.296 0.807 0.802 0.516 0.386
(0.42) (0.30) (0.39) (0.28) (0.55) (0.45) (0.42) (0.33) (-1.46) (-1.41) (0.62) (0.62) (0.38) (0.28)
Resource -1.173 -0.802 -1.710 -1.402 -1.309 -0.881 -1.345 -0.923 -1.047 -0.889 -2.110 -1.868 -2.065 -1.722
(-0.42) (-0.30) (-0.63) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.31) (-0.51) (-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.73) (-0.61) (-0.79) (-0.61)
Constant 15.93 7.586 17.66 8.284 16.97 7.662 16.16 6.781 -0.0600 -3.001 20.29 4.215 18.43 8.978
(1.34) (0.45) (1.44) (0.49) (1.40) (0.46) (1.33) (0.40) (-0.00) (-0.14) (1.38) (0.24) (1.50) (0.53)
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 308 308 308 308 307 307 307 307 195 195 307 307 308 308
adjusted R2 0.118 0.115 0.113 0.107 0.115 0.110 0.111 0.107 0.229 0.223 0.118 0.118 0.114 0.109
Panel C Control Variable
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5.2.4. Endogeneity  
There is a major concern about potential endogeneity in models containing 
corporate governance variables (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Zhou, 2001; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010; Coles et al., 2012) and this problem is particularly pronounced in 
tests of the relationship between corporate governance quality and firm valuation 
(Brown & Caylor, 2006; Henry, 2008). In the case of private placements, it is 
unclear whether better corporate governance enhances the valuation of private 
equity or whether more highly valued issuing firms choose better corporate 
governance mechanisms. To address this causality problem between private 
placement discount and corporate governance quality, I used the lagged value of 
corporate governance measures (Brown & Caylor, 2006) in the basic regression 
models in Section 5.2.2. 
However, this is only a weak solution since corporate governance variables 
tend to be sticky. For example, Brown et al. (2011) find that Australian firms’ 
corporate governance practices are highly correlated in adjacent years (the 
maximum correlation coefficient is 0.89 and the minimum is 0.72). Therefore, 
using lagged endogenous regressors may not fully address endogeneity concern 
in my study. 
I therefore use an instrumental variable approach. Jaffe (1986) argues that 
industry level governance is potentially an effective instrument as industry 
practices offer a benchmark of governance quality which firms may seek out and 
yet they are independent of the firm’s characteristics. Accordingly, I use the 
industry average corporate governance as the instrumental variable for firm level 
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corporate governance (Knyazeva, 2007). Specifically, I employ four industry-level 
governance variables and they are Industry GOV (measured by the average 
Horwath governance index per industry per year); Industry Board Indep (measured 
by the average board independence per industry per year); Industry Board Size 
(measured as the average board size per industry per year); and Industry Board 
Meet (measured as the average board meeting frequency per industry per year).  
In the first stage regression, I regress governance variables on their 
respective industry average. Table 5.4 shows that all of the four instrumental 
variables (Industry GOV, Industry Board Indep, Industry Board Size, and Industry 
Board Meet) are significantly related to firm-level governance variables. The 
strength of the instruments is corroborated by the F-statistic from Wald test, 
which all reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are weak.  
In the second stage, I use the fitted value from the first stage regression as 
the instrument for GOV Index, Board Indep, Board Size, and Board Meet. Table 5.5 
compares the estimated coefficient value from the OLS and the 2SLS regressions. 
Specifications (1) shows GOV Index is significant in the OLS model but not in the 
2SLS. Specifications (9) and (11) show board meeting frequency is significant in the 
OLS model but not in the 2SLS model. Moreover, in the 2SLS model, the sign of 
the relationship changes with board meeting frequency being negatively related 
to placement discounts, consistent with the monitoring hypothesis (H1). 
I also conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test and chi-squared statistics to 
determine whether corporate governance variables are endogeneous and 
whether a 2SLS model is appropriate. The results in Table 5.5 show that in most 
cases the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected for both tests. The 
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only exception is Board Meet. In Specifications (9) and (11), the DWH tests show 
that in contrast to previous results in OLS model, Board Meet is endogenously 
related with private placement discounts. Overall, I find at best weak evidence 
that better governance leads to lower private placement discounts.
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Table 5.4: Panel A first stage regression results 
The dependent variable of the second stage regression is Discounts, the percentage difference between the offer price and the issuer’s closing 
price on day -5 prior to the private placement announcement date. GOV Index is the Horwath governance ranking. Board Indep is the percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of board meetings in a year. Industry GOV, Industry Board Indep, Industry Board Size, and Industry Board Meet are the industry 
average of the corresponding corporate governance measures by year and by industry. These four industry-level governance variables are my 
instrumental variables. P-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Note: Specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) include Issue Size as one of 
information asymmetry proxies; while Specification (2), (4), (6), and (8) employ Firm Size instead. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent
GOV 
Index
GOV 
Index
Board 
Indep
Board 
Indep
Board 
Meet
Board 
Meet
Board 
Size
Board 
Size
Industry GOV 2.45** 1.98**
(0.015) (0.049)
Industry Board Indep 3.18***  2.89***
 (0.002) (0.004)
Industry Board Meet 2.09** 1.97**
(0.038) (0.050)
Industry Board Size 1.71* 1.57
(0.088) (0.118)
Constant -0.33 -1.16 -0.01 -0.57 -0.92 -1.33 -0.80 -1.08
(0.739) (0.249) (0.991) (0.566) (0.361)  (0.185) (0.423) (0.279)
Information 
Asymmetry Proxies
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 308 308 307 307 195  195 307 307
adjusted R2 0.2835 0.3093 0.0557 0.0583 0.0782 0.1300 0.3625 0.4271
F-statistic 5.53 6.09 2.76 2.69 2.38 2.73 10.85 20.30
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Table 5.5: Panel B comparison of OLS and 2SLS 
 
Note: Specifications (1), (2), (5), (6), (9), (10), (13), and (14) include Issue Size as one of information asymmetry proxies; while Specification (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12), (15), and (16) employ 
Firm Size instead. 
 
Dependent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
OLS      
Issue Size
2SLS     
Issue Size
OLS       
Firm Size
2SLS       
Firm Size
OLS   
Issue Size
2SLS    
Issue Size
OLS      
Firm Size
2SLS     
Firm Size
OLS      
Issue Size
2SLS    
Issue Size
OLS     
Firm Size
2SLS      
Firm Size
OLS      
Issue Size
2SLS       
Issue Size
OLS    
Firm Size
2SLS     
Firm Size
GOV Index 0.0528* 0.123 0.0454 0.102
(0.063) (0.483) (0.126) (0.619)
Board Indep -0.273 18.48 -0.0929 15.14
(0.956) (0.517) (0.985) (0.629)
Board Meet 7.046* -20.59 7.581* -24.83
(0.095) (0.269) (0.087) (0.269)
Board Size -2.410 -15.45 -4.522 -27.43
(0.503) (0.574) (0.284) (0.438)
Constant 14.49 11.69 4.153 0.569 15.48 1.263 0.636 -7.172 1.398 41.92 0.117 20.38 16.77 24.86 1.912 8.619
(0.175) (0.354) (0.673) (0.953) (0.157) (0.960) (0.950) (0.731) (0.928) (0.201) (0.992) (0.360) (0.146) (0.230) (0.848) (0.598)
Information 
Asymmetry 
Proxies
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 308 308 308 308 307 307 307 307 195 195 195 195 307 307 307 307
adjusted R2 0.125 0.107 0.118 0.106 0.115 0.0738 0.110 0.0825 0.254 0 0.254 0 0.118 0.0486 0.117 -0.0741
Chi-squared 67.38 66.69 74.74 75.20 56.21 64.84 69.82 63.76
F-statistic 0.15635 0.06516 0.37414 0.20376 3.53565 3.82215 0.24684 0.57836
(0.693) (0.7988) (0.5415) (0.6522) (0.0623) (0.0527) (0.6199) (0.4479)
Discounts
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity
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5.2.5. Self-selection Problem 
Since the decision for raising capital through private placements may not 
be random, in that firms with higher information asymmetry/lower governance 
self-select private placements (over rights offerings), the above results may be 
spurious. As such, I collect relevant data for all public offerings issued by the top 
250 Australian listed firms during my sample period 2002-2009 from Connect 4 
and SIRCA database. In total, there are 736 public offerings; of these, 102 (13.86) 
are rights offerings and 634 (86.14%) are dividend reinvestment plans.  
I account for the selection bias problem using the Heckman (1979) two 
step estimation procedures. In the first stage, I estimate the likelihood of firms 
issuing a private placement versus a rights offering based on a probit model 
(Equation 4) suggested by Wu (2001), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005), and Akhigbe 
et al. (2006). In the second stage, I compute the inverse Mills ratio Ivm from the 
probit model (Equation 4) and include it as an explanatory variable in the second 
stage regression. Therefore, my model for private placement discount consists of 
a selection equation (Equation 4) and a regression equation (Equation 5): 
 
Decision (selection) equation: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐺 + 𝑎2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝑎4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑎5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 
𝑎6𝐵𝑀 + 𝑎7𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑎9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖          (4) 
 
Regression equation: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐺𝐶𝑖 + 𝑏2𝐼𝐴𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 +  𝐼𝑣𝑚 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (5) 
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In the selection equation (Equation 4), PPi equals 1 for private placements and 0 
for rights offer.  
Based on prior literature (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Lee & Kocher, 2001; Wu, 
2004; Akhigbe et al., 2006; Barnes & Walker, 2006), I identify a number of factors 
that may influence the offering type decision. Smaller and younger firms have less 
analyst following and a shorter historical financial record (Datta et al., 1999). Since 
these firms are likely to have more severe asymmetric information problem, they 
are more likely to choose private placements for raising equity. Accordingly, I 
include both Firm Size and Firm Age in the probit model (Equation 4), where Firm 
Age is the time interval between the listing date and the equity issuing date. 
Dierkens (1991) argues that firms with a larger share price fluctuation have 
greater information asymmetry and are thus more likely to issue equity privately. I 
thus include Risk in the probit model. Jung et al. (1996) argue that firms are more 
likely to raise capital via a public offering than a private placement when there is 
financial slack because sufficient cash holdings demonstrate a low level of 
information asymmetry. Following Akhigbe et al. (2006), I expect Cash Ratio, cash 
holdings to total assets, to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of issuing 
private placements.  
Stulz (1990) shows that firm can take advantage of creditor monitoring to 
restrict managerial discretion by increasing its debt level. If the motivation for 
issuing private equity is to enhance monitoring (Wu, 2004; Wruck & Wu, 2009), I 
expect firms with a higher debt level to derive less marginal benefits from issuing 
private placements. In other words, the Leverage, total liability scaled by total 
asset, is negatively related to the propensity of issuing private equity. 
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Several studies suggest that the degree of information asymmetry 
increases with the growth opportunity of issuing firms because firms with larger 
growth opportunity are more difficult to value (Lee & Kocher, 2001; Barnes & 
Walker, 2006). Therefore, I expect firms with greater growth opportunity are 
more likely to choose private placements. I include both BM and a Tech dummy. 
Brophy et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2010b) provide evidence that private 
placement firms are subject to extreme uncertainty and that issuing firms utilize 
private placements only when they are unable to raise capital through public 
offerings because of their poor operating performance. Thus, I also include 
Profitability, the operating income before interest, tax and deprecation divided by 
total asset, in the equity issuing choice probit model. Since information about 
lagged profitability would have already been reflected in the share price in an 
efficient market (Fama, 1970), I do not expect past profitability to be related to 
the private placement discount. Therefore, Profitability provides the ideal 
instrument for this Heckman two-stage model (private placement discount).  
The first stage probit regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 5.6. 
Consistent with prior studies, all explanatory variables have the expected sign and 
are significant at least at the 10% level, except for Firm Size. Most importantly, the 
instrumental variable Profitability is significant at the 5% level.  
In the second stage, the inverse Mills ratio Ivm is included as an 
explanatory variable in the private placement discount model. The Heckman 
correction regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.6. After including 
the inverse Mils ratio, neither the relationship between the private placement 
discount and corporate governance quality, nor the implication and significance of 
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information asymmetry proxies change. That is, the information asymmetry 
hypothesis (H2) is supported (larger private placement discount can be observed 
among firms with smaller issue size and BM ratio) but there is little evidence 
supporting the monitoring hypothesis (H1) (corporate governance quality 
insignificantly influences private placement discounts). Moreover, Ivm is 
insignificant in all specifications, which indicates that the findings in Section 5.2.2 
are not subject to a self-selection bias. 
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Table 5.6: Heckman two-step regression for selection bias (private placement discount) 
This table presents regression for Heckman (1979) two step approach. In Panel A, I employ a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a private placement versus a public offering. The 
dependent variable equals 1 for private placements and 0 otherwise. GOV Index is the Horwath governance ranking. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at 
month-end prior to private placement announcement. Risk is the standard deviation of firms' monthly relative returns over one year period prior to private placement announcement. 
BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Leverage is total liability scaled by total asset. Profitability is the operating income before interest, tax and 
deprecation divided by total asset. Tech equals 0 if firms from information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Firm Age is the time interval between 
time interval between firms IPO date and equity issuing date. Cash Ratio is receipts from customers less payments to suppliers and employees scaled by total assets. In Panel B, I 
compute the inverse Mills ratio Ivm and include it as an explanatory variable in the second stage regression. The dependent variable Discounts is the percentage difference between the 
offer price and the issuer’s closing price on day -5, 5 day prior to the private placement announcement date. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality equals 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the 
natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings in a year. Issue Size is the natural logarithm of the total capital raised via private placement. Fraction Placed is the number of 
shares offered as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the issue. Turnover is the average ratio of the number of shares traded to shares outstanding over (-60,-1) days prior to 
the private placement announcement. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares directly owned by all shareholders with more than 5% ownership. Single equals 1 if private equities 
are sold to just one investor and 0 otherwise. Debt payment equals 1 if private equity is used to repay debt and 0 otherwise. P-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
GOV Index -0.0164*
(-1.96) GOV Index 0.0537 0.0375
Firm Size 2.996*** (1.54) (1.03)
(6.09) Hig GOV 1.176 0.502
Risk 24.42*** (0.74) (0.31)
(4.75) CEO Duality 0.254 0.608
BM -1.865*** (0.09) (0.22)
(-4.33) Board Indep -1.326 -2.079
Leverage -6.773*** (-0.24) (-0.38)
(-4.52) Board Meet 8.069 7.682
Profitability -5.340** (1.45) (1.40)
(-2.03)
Tech -2.049** Board Size -2.991 -3.857
(-2.51) (-0.69) (-1.02)
Firm Age -0.0589*** Issue Size -1.401** -1.299** -0.918 -0.925 -0.432 -0.687 -1.236**
(-2.72) (-2.44) (-2.27) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-0.50) (-1.00) (-2.09)
Panel A: Private placement vs Public offering Panel B:  OLS regression Private placement discounts
Panel A: Corporate Governance
Panel B Information Asymmetry
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Table 5.6 Heckman two-step regression for selection bias (private placement discount) (continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Cash Ratio -7.391** Firm Size -0.479 -0.568 -0.487 -0.543 -0.448 -0.445 -0.597
(-2.36) (-0.70) (-0.80) (-0.67) (-0.75) (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.83)
Constant -64.14*** BM -437.7*** -394.9** -412.8** -367.5** -404.2** -379.9** -400.9** -375.4** 43.32 60.00 -363.8* -336.7* -397.1** -361.7**
(-6.08) (-2.62) (-2.32) (-2.35) (-2.06) (-2.30) (-2.15) (-2.35) (-2.18) (0.10) (0.14) (-1.96) (-1.88) (-2.28) (-2.05)
Fraction Placed 33.48* 17.67 31.24* 16.33 26.93 16.31 27.04 16.24 25.13 21.19 25.08 17.17 30.45* 16.24
(1.88) (1.10) (1.79) (1.01) (1.59) (1.01) (1.61) (1.02) (1.22) (1.13) (1.58) (1.07) (1.79) (1.02)
Turnover 163.6 293.9 125.3 233.9 115.4 212.8 111.1 211.5 -221.9 -168.9 102.7 175.4 98.75 223.8
(0.68) (1.23) (0.51) (0.96) (0.46) (0.87) (0.44) (0.86) (-0.55) (-0.44) (0.40) (0.70) (0.39) (0.91)
Tech 5.927 2.520 5.163 5.338 4.878 5.228 4.937 5.284 -4.294 -3.844 3.549 3.346 4.685 5.112
(1.13) (0.44) (1.02) (1.04) (0.96) (1.03) (0.97) (1.03) (-0.80) (-0.72) (0.63) (0.59) (0.93) (0.99)
Risk -10.98 -14.56* -9.644 -12.94* -9.932 -12.67 -10.03 -13.12 -8.322 -10.13 -10.23 -12.70* -9.484 -12.98*
(-1.44) (-1.84) (-1.23) (-1.66) (-1.24) (-1.62) (-1.28) (-1.65) (-0.65) (-0.85) (-1.34) (-1.66) (-1.21) (-1.68)
Blockholding -0.00830 0.000118 -0.00661 -0.00202 -0.00175 0.00243 -0.00121 0.00323 0.00746 0.00643 -0.000259 0.00282 -0.00723 -0.00242
(-0.25) (0.00) (-0.20) (-0.06) (-0.05) (0.07) (-0.04) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (-0.01) (0.09) (-0.22) (-0.07)
Single -13.02*** -12.09** -13.46** -12.56** -13.25** -12.57** -13.25** -12.57** -20.01*** -19.78*** -13.14** -12.67** -13.54** -12.62**
(-2.61) (-2.37) (-2.60) (-2.37) (-2.54) (-2.34) (-2.52) (-2.33) (-2.93) (-2.81) (-2.57) (-2.37) (-2.58) (-2.35)
Debt payment -0.757 -0.901 -0.718 -0.930 -0.442 -0.535 -0.432 -0.533 -1.580 -1.395 -0.207 -0.218 -0.712 -0.924
(-0.49) (-0.58) (-0.46) (-0.59) (-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.46) (-0.59)
Ivm 0.264 -0.484 0.237 -0.628 0.198 -0.570 0.102 -0.804 -2.685 -3.336 -0.0486 -0.802 0.321 -0.630
(0.11) (-0.21) (0.11) (-0.28) (0.09) (-0.25) (0.05) (-0.35) (-0.82) (-0.98) (-0.02) (-0.35) (0.15) (-0.28)
Industry Included Constant 24.66** 17.96 25.90** 19.00 20.45** 17.31 21.54* 20.28 -9.866 -5.766 23.17** 24.81 25.78** 20.13
Year Included (2.32) (1.05) (2.50) (1.03) (1.99) (0.94) (1.88) (1.02) (-0.48) (-0.27) (2.16) (1.09) (2.45) (1.09)
N 822 Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Chi-square 72.27 Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Pseudo R2 0.954 N 242 242 242 242 240 240 240 240 158 158 240 240 242 242
Classificatory accuracy 98.68% adjusted R2 0.149 0.136 0.140 0.129 0.134 0.129 0.134 0.129 0.190 0.191 0.137 0.136 0.142 0.132
Panel C Control Variable
Panel A: Private placement vs Public offering Panel B:  OLS regression Private placement discounts
 85 
 
5.3. Private Placement Issuing Choice 
5.3.1. Univariate Analysis 
I begin the empirical analysis by testing the mean and median difference in 
firm characteristics between private placements of equity with an SPP and private 
placements of equity alone. As shown in Panel A of Table 5.7, the measures of 
corporate governance vary significantly with the private placement issuing choice. 
Specifically, firms issuing private equity with an SPP have on average a 16% higher 
Horwath governance index than those which issue private equity alone. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
I also find that issuing firms without CEO duality are more likely to include 
an SPP offer in their private placements. Additionally, the proportion of 
independent directors (Board Indep), board size (Board Size), and the frequency of 
board meetings (Board Meet) are statistically significantly higher when private 
equity is issued with an SPP offer. These findings are consistent with the third 
hypothesis that firms with higher corporate governance quality are more likely to 
issue private placements with an SPP.   
In line with Brown et al. (2008), I find that Current Ratio, Cash Ratio, and 
Leverage are significantly different at the 10% level or better in Panel B of Table 5.7. 
Therefore, firms that choose to issue private placements with an SPP have lower 
current assets and cash holdings, but more debt. Surprisingly, there is no 
significant difference in the Non top 20 variable across the issuing method. Since 
an SPP offer provides an equal entitlement to all existing shareholders 
independent of the number of shares already held, firms with dispersed 
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ownership have the potential to raise a greater amount of equity and are thus 
more likely to choose private placements with an SPP offer. This finding may be 
influenced by the fact that I only consider SPP issues that are combined with 
private placements. Additionally, Resource is significant different at the 10% level, 
which shows that resource firms are less likely to issue an SPP offer with a private 
placement than other firms. Finally, Firm Size is significantly different at the 1% 
level, suggesting that private placement with an SPP offer is more likely to be 
issued by larger firms.  
 
Table 5.7: Univariate test of mean and median difference in variables between 
private placement of equity with an SPP and equity alone, 2002-2009 
GOV Index is the Horwath governance ranking. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. 
CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board 
Meet is the natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings in a year. Firm Size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private placement announcement. 
Current Ratio is current assets scaled by current liabilities. Non top 20 Is the total percentage of shares 
held by non-top 20 shareholders. Cash Ratio is the receipts from customers less payments to suppliers 
and employees scaled by total assets. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets. P-values for 
t-test (mean) and Mann-Whitney test (median) are reported in the last two columns. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
N Mean Median N Mean Median t-test Mann Whitney
GOV Index 183 41.55 39.60 131 57.52 57.60 0.000*** 0.000***
High GOV 183 0.41 0.00 131 0.62 1.00 0.000*** 0.000***
CEO Duality 181 0.06 0.00 130 0.01 0.00 0.007*** 0.017**
Board Indep 181 0.72 0.71 130 0.75 0.77 0.076* 0.041**
Board Size 181 1.88 1.79 130 2.01 1.95 0.001*** 0.000***
Board Meet 108 2.32 2.40 90 2.42 2.48 0.034** 0.061*
Firm Size 183 19.43 19.34 131 20.83 20.61 0.000*** 0.000***
Current Ratio 178 6.67 1.54 124 2.71 1.40 0.092* 0.179
Non top 20 182 0.36 0.35 128 0.37 0.37 0.501 0.391
Cash Ratio 174 0.02 0.02 117 -0.15 0.09 0.453 0.000***
Leverage 183 0.41 0.43 131 0.55 0.58 0.000*** 0.000***
Resource 183 0.38 0 131 0.29 0 0.0861* 0.0896*
Issued with SPPWithout SPP p values of different test
Panel A Corporate Governance
Panel B Control Variables
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5.3.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 5.8 presents the results of various specifications for Equation (2), 
where the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 for private placements of 
equity with an SPP and 0 for private placements of equity alone. Specifications (1) 
and (3) show that both GOV Index and High GOV dummy have the expected 
positive sign and are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively. 
The coefficient value on GOV Index is 0.0093 (Specification 1), indicating that a one 
unit increase on Horwath governance index results in a 0.0093 increase in the 
z-score of the likelihood of issuing an SPP offer. For High GOV, the coefficient 
value of 0.333 (Specification 3) means that firms with a higher than median value 
of the Horwath governance index have a 0.333 higher z-score of the propensity of 
placing a private equity with an SPP offer than those with an index value below 
the median. Therefore, consistent with hypothesis H3, better governed firms with 
a higher Horwath governance index are more likely to issue a private placement 
with an SPP.   
In addition, I test the role of independent director and board size in private 
placement issuing choice in specifications (6), (7) and (10). The results show that, 
consistent with the univariate analysis, Board Indep and Board Size are significantly 
positively related to the likelihood of issuing private placements with an SPP. 
These findings support the argument that firms with greater board independence 
and larger boards are more likely to issue a private placement of equity with an 
SPP. Although CEO Duality and Board Meet have the expected sign, they are 
statistically insignificant. I note that the inclusion of corporate governance 
measures in the regressions generally results in an increase in pseudo R2 
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suggesting that these variables have explanatory power.  
Apart from Non top 20, I find significant results for all the control variables. 
Leverage has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that firms with a 
larger debt ratio are more likely to issue an SPP offer with the private placement. 
Contrary to the univariate tests and Brown et al. (2008), I find firms with larger 
cash holdings (Cash Ratio) are more likely to issue private placements with an SPP. 
One possible reason is the free cash flow argument (Jensen, 1986): firms issuing 
private placements have severe agency problem (resulting in less cash flows) 
relative to their counterparts that choose public offerings (Hertzel & Smith, 1993). 
That is, firms that choose to issue an SPP are the ones that have larger cash 
holdings. Firm Size has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications, indicating that larger firms are more likely to issue private 
placements with an SPP. Consistent with the univariate analysis, Resource is 
negatively and significantly related to SPP at the 10% level in most specifications. 
Therefore, non-participating shareholders in private placement transactions in 
Australia are better protected in non-resource firms than in resource firms. 
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Table 5.8: Probit regression of the determinants of private placement issuing choice in Australia between 2002 and 2009 
The dependent variable is the dummy variable, SPP, which is equal to 1 for private placement with an SPP and 0 for private placement of equity alone. GOV Index is 
the governance ranking in Horwath report. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board Indep is the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of board meetings in a year. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at month-end prior to private placement announcement. 
Current Ratio is current assets scaled by current liabilities. Non top 20 Is the total percentage of shares held by non-top 20 shareholders. Cash Ratio is the receipts 
from customers less payments to suppliers and employees scaled by total assets. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets. Resource equals 1 if private 
equities are issued by resource firms (GICS 101020 & 151040) and 0 otherwise. P-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GOV Index 0.00930***
(0.010)
High GOV 0.269 0.333*
(0.121) (0.061)
CEO Duality -0.985 -1.043
(0.117) (0.126)
Board Indep 1.506** 1.205**
(0.012) (0.043)
Board Meet 0.252 0.395
(0.460) (0.229)
Board Size 0.630**
(0.041)
Panel A Corporate Governance
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Table 5.8: Probit regression of the determinants of private placement issuing choice in Australia between 2002 and 2009 
(continued) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Firm Size 0.382*** 0.392*** 0.394*** 0.417*** 0.292*** 0.404***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Leverage 0.902* 0.913* 0.930** 0.425 0.958**
(0.058) (0.053) (0.049) (0.453) (0.041)
Current Ratio -0.0129 -0.0181 -0.00819 -0.0228 -0.0144 -0.0204 -0.0120 -0.0133 -0.0112 -0.0299* -0.0227 -0.0132
(0.400) (0.234) (0.623) (0.127) (0.385) (0.205) (0.482) (0.418) (0.560) (0.067) (0.130) (0.420)
Non top 20 0.614 0.664 0.267 0.846 0.481 0.794 0.436 0.742 0.393 0.631 0.789 0.390
(0.268) (0.228) (0.632) (0.129) (0.393) (0.150) (0.439) (0.334) (0.602) (0.271) (0.152) (0.487)
Cash Ratio 0.548 0.544 0.790* 0.560 0.807* 0.842* 1.032** 0.285 0.299 0.828* 0.529 0.765*
(0.201) (0.220) (0.082) (0.211) (0.084) (0.084) (0.037) (0.628) (0.619) (0.079) (0.234) (0.094)
Resource -0.300 -0.382 -0.634* -0.605* -0.906** -0.574* -0.878** -0.372 -0.581 -0.727* -0.441 -0.723*
(0.381) (0.267) (0.080) (0.093) (0.019) (0.079) (0.014) (0.365) (0.175) (0.051) (0.213) (0.057)
Constant -10.80*** -10.61*** -1.387** -10.36*** -1.023* -12.12*** -1.983*** -7.932*** -1.070 -2.196** -10.68*** -1.105*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.348) (0.016) (0.000) (0.054)
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 275 275 275 274 274 274 274 175 175 274 275 275
Chi-square 64.98 58.35 44.41 60.34 39.10 62.89 45.75 41.67 33.72 38.89 57.76 36.41
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.162 0.112 0.170 0.118 0.176 0.118 0.152 0.124 0.105 0.156 0.102
Classificatory accuracy 71.27% 71.64% 69.06% 68.98% 66.79% 72.63% 65.33% 66.86% 66.86% 67.15% 68.36% 65.82%
Panel B Control Variables
 91 
 
5.3.3. Self-selection Problem 
In order to address the potential self-selection problem, I run the Heckman 
two-step approach as before, except that the second stage is now a probit 
regression on SPP choice. The system of equation is as follows: 
Decision (selection) equation (reproduced from above): 
𝑃𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐺 + 𝑎2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝑎4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑎5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 +
𝑎6𝐵𝑀 + 𝑎7𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑎9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖 (4) 
 
Probit regression equation: 
𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐶𝐺𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑐2𝐼𝑣𝑚 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖    (6) 
 
In this system of equations, BM, the ratio of book value of equity to the 
market value of equity, is the instrument. As argued in Section 5.2.5, issuing firms 
with a higher BM ratio have greater growth opportunities and are associated with 
a higher level of information asymmetry. High BM firms are thus more likely to 
choose a private placement than a public offer. However, the choice of issuing 
method in private placements (with or without an SPP) is unlikely to be related to 
BM. Lee and Kocher (2001) and Burton and Power (2003) show that firms issuing 
public offerings are associated with fewer growth opportunities. In the case of 
SPP offers (a type of public offering), Brown et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
growth opportunity (BM) of the issuing firm is irrelevant to the likelihood of 
issuing an SPP offer. 
Panel A of Table 5.9 shows the instrumental variable BM has the expected 
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sign and is significant at the 1% level. In the second stage, I compute the inverse 
Mills ratio Ivm from the decision model (Equation 4) and include it as an 
explanatory variable in the private placement issuing choice model (Equation 6). 
The Heckman correction regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.9. 
Consistent with the findings in Section 5.3.2, except for Board Indep, all corporate 
governance quality measures have the expected sign and are significantly related 
to the propensity of issuing an SPP offer with a private placement, after including 
the inverse Mils ratio. Hypothesis H3 remains supported. Furthermore, in all 
specifications, Ivm is insignificant, suggesting self-selection problem is not a major 
concern in my study. 
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Table 5.9: Heckman two-step regression for selection bias (private placement issuing choice) 
This table presents regression for Heckman (1979) two step approach. In Panel A, I employ a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a private placement versus a public offering. The 
dependent variable equals 1 for private placements and 0 otherwise. GOV Index is the Horwath governance ranking. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at 
month-end prior to private placement announcement. Risk is the standard deviation of firms' monthly relative returns over one year period prior to private placement announcement. 
BM is book value of total equity divided by market value of equity. Leverage is total liability scaled by total asset. Profitability is the operating income before interest, tax and 
deprecation divided by total asset. Tech equals 0 if firms from information technology and telecommunication service sectors and 0 otherwise. Firm Age is the time interval between 
time interval between firms IPO date and equity issuing date. Cash Ratio is receipts from customers less payments to suppliers and employees scaled by total assets. In Panel B, I 
compute the inverse Mills ratio Ivm and include it as an explanatory variable in the second stage regression. The dependent variable is the dummy variable, SPP, which is equal to 1 for 
private placement with an SPP and 0 for private placement of equity alone. High GOV indicates GOV Index above sample median. CEO Duality equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman. Board 
Indep is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Board Meet is the natural logarithm of the total 
number of board meetings in a year. Current Ratio is current assets scaled by current liabilities. Non top 20 Is the total percentage of shares held by non-top 20 shareholders. P-values (in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Firm Age -0.170**
(-2.57) GOV Index 0.0147***
Firm Size 5.732*** (0.000)
(3.30) Hig GOV 0.482** 0.465**
Cash Ratio -6.044*** (0.016) (0.020)
(-3.17) CEO Duality -1.073* -1.041*
Risk 50.80*** (0.066) (0.077)
(3.05) Board Indep 0.970 0.901
BM -3.226*** (0.118) (0.131)
(-2.82) Board Meet 0.752** 0.710**
Profitability -6.032*** (0.035) (0.045)
(-2.65) Board Size 0.594*
Tech -1.096 (0.071)
(-0.76)
Leverage -7.655* Firm Size 0.0464 0.0137 -0.000374 0.0122 -0.00950 -0.0183
(-1.90) (0.591) (0.869) (0.996) (0.886) (0.925) (0.820)
Panel A: Private placement vs. Public offering Panel B:  Probit regression Private placement of equity vs. Private placement of equity and SPP
Panel B Control Variables
Panel A Corporate Governance
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Table 5.9: Heckman two-step regression for selection bias (private placement issuing choice) (continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Leverage -0.224 -0.164 -0.218 -0.921 -0.309
(0.532) (0.647) (0.543) (0.114) (0.381)
Current Ratio 0.00722 0.00694 0.00530 0.00603 0.00533* 0.00625 0.00508* -0.0463 -0.0804* 0.00488 0.00658 0.00518*
(0.297) (0.337) (0.121) (0.112) (0.062) (0.210) (0.093) (0.126) (0.055) (0.139) (0.166) (0.066)
Non top 20 0.00542 0.00474 0.00433 0.00513 0.00491 0.00465 0.00426 0.0107 0.00942 0.00515 0.00456 0.00443
(0.324) (0.379) (0.411) (0.349) (0.359) (0.391) (0.420) (0.155) (0.211) (0.331) (0.400) (0.403)
Cash Ratio 0.450 0.312 0.360 0.276 0.305 0.259 0.313 0.690 0.662 0.325 0.288 0.325
(0.355) (0.511) (0.451) (0.568) (0.532) (0.603) (0.529) (0.311) (0.328) (0.504) (0.548) (0.502)
Ivm -0.405 -0.375 -0.344 -0.341 -0.302 -0.265 -0.239 -0.643 -0.325 -0.338 -0.334 -0.232
(0.364) (0.357) (0.383) (0.371) (0.407) (0.508) (0.528) (0.146) (0.485) (0.350) (0.385) (0.532)
Constant -128.2*** Constant -3.384 -1.761 -1.314** -0.921 -0.871 -1.988 -1.547** -1.634 -1.076 -2.386** -0.565 -0.892
(-3.37) (0.152) (0.420) (0.034) (0.662) (0.158) (0.403) (0.047) (0.559) (0.394) (0.012) (0.788) (0.156)
Industry Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Included Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 802 N 233 233 233 231 231 231 231 151 151 231 233 233
Chi-square 79.88 Chi-square 46.45 29.08 30.48 23.96 25.25 26.01 27.21 27.03 32.54 25.89 20.55 22.88
Pseudo R2 0.967 Pseudo R2 0.128 0.0938 0.0948 0.0883 0.0889 0.0807 0.0817 0.144 0.155 0.0847 0.0742 0.0761
Classificatory accuracy  99.50% Classificatory accuracy 67.81% 67.38%  63.95% 63.95%  63.95% 65.37%  65.37%  65.37% 65.37% 65.37% 66.95% 66.52%
Panel A: Private placement vs. Public offering Panel B:  Probit regression Private placement of equity vs. Private placement of equity and SPP
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5.4. Chapter Summary 
Consistent with expectations, the empirical results presented in this 
chapter show that corporate governance quality matters to investor protection as 
far as private equity issuing choice is concerned. There is convincing evidence 
showing that issuing firms with a higher Horwath governance index, larger 
proportion of independent directors, and larger board size are more likely to issue 
private placements of equity with an SPP offer in addressing non-participating 
shareholders’ concerns about wealth dilution in private placement transactions.  
In contrast to the monitoring hypothesis, the cross-section analysis shows 
that corporate governance quality is not significantly related to private placement 
discounts, and that this result is robust to a correction for potential endogeneity. 
Consistent with past studies, I also find evidence supporting the information 
hypothesis – firms with a smaller issue size, a lower book-to-market ratio, a higher 
fraction of equity placed, and from the high-technology industry are associated 
with a larger private placement discount. The results presented in this study do 
not support the proposition that private equity investors are willing to pay more 
for issuing firms with better corporate governance quality, but support the 
proposition that investors demand a greater discount for greater information 
asymmetry.  
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CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Summary of Findings and Discussion 
Previous studies show that corporate governance and information 
asymmetry matter to firm performance, market valuation, insider trading, related 
party transactions, and access to external finance. This thesis examines the role of 
corporate governance and information asymmetry in the context of private 
placements.  
Private placements involve firms selling equity privately to an individual or 
a group of sophisticated investors at a discounted price, which entails a wealth 
transfer from the issuing firm to private equity purchasers at the expense of 
non-participating shareholders. This motivates me to test whether and how 
corporate governance quality and information asymmetry are related to the 
discount. Specifically, I investigate whether firms with better corporate 
governance and lower information asymmetry have lower private placement 
discounts. Additionally, I test whether better governed firms are more likely to 
issue an anti-dilution instrument in the form of an SPP with the private placement.  
I conduct the research in Australia, which provides an ideal setting since 
the regulators impose a low level of regulatory control on private placements and 
corporate governance policy implementation relative to other countries such as 
the US, the UK, and Singapore. This provides a good setting to test the impacts of 
firm-level governance quality on investor protection in private placements with 
less influence from the law and regulations.  
My study employs OLS regressions and a probit model with robust 
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standard errors for a sample of 329 private placements issued by the top 250 
Australian listed firms over an 8-year period (2002-2009). The results show that 
corporate governance quality, as measured by the Horwath governance index, 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, and board size, is 
significantly and positively related to the likelihood of issuing private placement 
with an SPP offer. This contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence 
that corporate governance quality matters to firms’ financing decision. 
Specifically, better governed firms choose an issuing method that favours 
non-participating shareholders and protects their wealth in private placement 
transactions. 
Contrary to predictions, I do not find any evidence supporting the 
monitoring hypothesis that corporate governance quality plays a direct role in 
private equity valuation. The results show that private equity purchasers do not 
pay a premium for good corporate governance. However, there is support for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, where private equity investors demand a 
larger discount to compensate for the cost of information search cost arising from 
the pervasive information asymmetry of private placement firms. The results 
remain intact after addressing potential endogeneity. 
The ASIC policy changes in 2008 and 2009 on SPPs aimed at protecting the 
interests of retail investors (ASX, 2010) by increasing the maximum subscription 
amount from AUD 5,000 to AUD 15,000 per shareholder in SPP offers. After 2008, 
non-participating shareholders are allowed to purchase more discounted shares 
at the same price as private equity purchasers than before. This change in policy 
allows non-participating shareholders to anti-dilute their ownership at a larger 
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extent in private placement transactions. At the same time, the increase in the 
upper limit of SPP offer subscription per shareholder, due to this policy change, 
also enhances the usefulness of SPP offers in raising capital for firms. Our results 
show that firms began to increasingly offer SPPs alongside private placements. 
Since corporate governance quality does not directly influence the pricing 
negotiation in private placements, one recommendation that can be drawn from 
this thesis would be to encourage the use of SPPs as a way to protect the interest 
of non-participating shareholders.  
 
6.2. Limitations 
There are two limitations in this study. First, the results are based only on 
the largest 250 firm listed on the ASX, which may limit my ability to generalize the 
results to smaller firms. To overcome this potential size bias, future studies could 
expand the sample to include smaller firms. 
Second, corporate governance is about a series of methods to control 
firms, for which researchers lack a unifying theory or framework. Therefore, the 
measurement of governance quality is not standardized. For instance, results on 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation are mixed, 
possibly due to varied measures of corporate governance (Bonn, 2004; Linden & 
Matolcsy, 2004). In this study, I employ several governance proxies including the 
Horwath governance index, CEO duality, board independence, board meeting 
frequency, and board size. Nevertheless, these numerous corporate governance 
measures may still be incomplete in fully reflecting the whole corporate 
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governance structure of issuing firms. In order to circumvent this restriction, 
further studies may consider forming a more comprehensive firm-level 
governance database covering the majority of Australian listed firms. 
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Appendix 1: The definition of SEOs in the UK, the US and Australia 
 
 
Country SEO methods Description
Rights Offers Shares are offered on a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders.
Open offers
Different from rights offers, shareholders who do not take their 
entitlement cannot sell them. The unsubscribed shares will be 
placed with institutional investors.
Placements
The underwriter undertakes to purchase new shares from the 
firm at a given price and then sell these to selected institutions. 
London stock exchange also requires a minimum of 25% of the 
new shares in placement to be offered to market makers. 
SEO (stand by offers)
Shares are offered on a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders. 
Underwriter guarantees the proceeds on any unsubscribed 
portion of the offer and sells the unsubscribed shares to its 
clients.
SEO (firm commitment offer)
Shares are offered on a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders. 
The underwriter guarantees total offering proceeds
Private placements
Firms sell a block of securities privately to a single or small group 
of investors.  According to the Securities Act Rule 144, private 
shares cannot be sold in the public market until two years after 
initial purchase
Private investment in public 
equity (PIPE)
Equity issues to a private group of professional investors without 
the need to for public registration prior to the transaction. 
Compared to private placements, PIPE is not restricted to resale 
limitations
Private placements
The definition of private placement is the same as that in the U.S. 
except for the resale restrictions
Renounceable rights offers
The definition of Renounceable rights offers is the same as the 
right offers in the U.K.
Non-renounceable rights 
offers
Shares are offered on a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders. 
However, It does not permit shareholders to sell the right, any 
unused entitlement is forfeited.
Share purchase plan
It provides existing shareholders the rights to purchase newly 
issued shares at a discount on market price without brokerage 
fees or stamp duty, but with a limitation on the total dollar 
amount.
U.K.
U.S.
Australia
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Appendix 2: ASX Corporate Governance Best Practice Recommendations 
The summary of ASX Corporate Governance Council Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, Second edition with 2010 amendment released in June 2010 
 
Principle 1 – Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
Recommendation 1.1: Companies should establish the functions reserved to the board and those 
delegated to senior executives and disclose those functions. 
Recommendation 1.2: Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of 
senior executives. 
Recommendation 1.3: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 1. 
 
Principle 2 - Structure the board to add value 
Recommendation 2.1: A majority of the board should be independent directors. 
Recommendation 2.2: The chair should be an independent director. 
Recommendation 2.3: The roles of chair and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the 
same individual. 
Recommendation 2.4: The board should establish a nomination committee. 
Recommendation 2.5: Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of 
the board, its committees and individual directors. 
Recommendation 2.6: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 2. 
 
Principle 3 - Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
Recommendation 3.1: Companies should establish a code of conduct and disclose the code or a 
summary of the code as to: 
Recommendation 3.1.1: the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity 
Recommendation 3.1.2: the practices necessary to take into account their legal obligations and the 
reasonable expectations of their stakeholders 
Recommendation 3.1.3:  the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and 
investigating reports of unethical practices. 
Recommendation 3.2: Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the 
policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to 
establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity for the board to assess annually 
both the objectives and progress in achieving them. 
Recommendation 3.3: Companies should disclose in each annual report the measurable objectives 
for achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and 
progress towards achieving them. 
Recommendation 3.4: Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and women on the 
board. 
Recommendation 3.5: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 3. 
 
Principle 4 - Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
Recommendation 4.1: The board should establish an audit committee. 
Recommendation 4.2: The audit committee should be structured so that it: 
Recommendation 4.2.1: consists only of non-executive directors 
Recommendation 4.2.2: consists of a majority of independent directors 
Recommendation 4.2.3: is chaired by an independent chair, who is not chair of the board 
Recommendation 4.2.4: has at least three members. 
Recommendation 4.3: The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
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Recommendation 4.4: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 4. 
 
Principle 5 - Make timely and balanced disclosure 
Recommendation 5.1: Companies should establish written policies designed to ensure compliance 
with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a senior executive 
level for that compliance and disclose those policies or a summary of those policies. 
Recommendation 5.2: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 5. 
 
Principle 6 - Respect the rights of shareholders 
Recommendation 6.1: Companies should design a communications policy for promoting effective 
communication with shareholders and encouraging their participation at general meetings and 
disclose their policy or a summary of that policy. 
Recommendation 6.2: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 6. 
 
Principle 7- Recognise and manage risk 
Recommendation 7.1: Companies should establish policies for the oversight and management of 
material business risks and disclose a summary of those policies. 
Recommendation 7.2: The board should require management to design and implement the risk 
management and internal control system to manage the company's material business risks and 
report to it on whether those risks are being managed effectively. The board should disclose that 
management has reported to it as to the effectiveness of the company's management of its 
material business risks. 
Recommendation 7.3: The board should disclose whether it has received assurance from the chief 
executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) that the declaration 
provided in accordance with section 295A of the Corporations Act is founded on a sound system of 
risk management and internal control and that the system is operating effectively in all material 
respects in relation to financial reporting risks. 
Recommendation 7.4: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 7. 
 
Principle 8- Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
Recommendation 8.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
Recommendation 8.2: The remuneration committee should be structured so that it: 
Recommendation 8.2.1: consists of a majority of independent directors 
Recommendation 8.2.2: is chaired by an independent chair 
Recommendation 8.2.3: has at least three members. 
Recommendation 8.3: Companies should clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive 
directors’ remuneration from that of executive directors and senior executives. 
Recommendation 8.4: Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to 
reporting on Principle 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
